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Dictation and Delegation in Securities Regulation 
USHA R. RODRIGUES* 
When Congress undertakes major financial reform, either it dictates the precise con-
tours of the law itself or it delegates the bulk of the rule making to an administrative 
agency. This choice has critical consequences. Making the law self-executing in fed-
eral legislation is swift, not subject to administrative tinkering, and less vulnerable 
than rule making to judicial second-guessing. Agency action is, in contrast, deliber-
ate, subject to ongoing bureaucratic fiddling, and more vulnerable than statutes to 
judicial challenge.  
This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the extent of congressional 
delegation in securities law from 1970 to the present day, examining nine pieces of 
congressional legislation. The data support what I call the dictation/delegation the-
sis. According to this thesis, even controlling for shifts in political-party dominance, 
Congress is more likely to delegate to an agency in the wake of a salient securities 
crisis than in a period of economic calm. In times of prosperity, when cohesive inter-
est groups with unitary preferences can summon enough political will to pass 
deregulatory legislation on their behalf, the result will be laws that cabin agency 
discretion. In other words, when industry can play offense, Congress itself engages 
in the making of governing rules and does not punt to an agency—even on issues that 
would seem the logical province of administrative technocrats. In contrast, following 
a crisis, industry is forced to play defense rather than offense. Its goal is to minimize 
the deleterious impact of inevitable legislation by shifting regulation as much as 
possible to the agency level, where it has time to regroup and often delay regulation 
until the political pressure for reform abates. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Why does Congress sometimes dictate the contours of securities legislation itself 
and other times delegate rule making to administrative agencies? Answering this 
question begins with recognizing the importance of the modern administrative state 
in separation-of-powers doctrine and sheds light on special-interest influence on law-
making. Though Congress is tasked with making law, the executive branch’s 
administrative agencies implement and administer a sizable portion of Congress’ 
enactments, determining by rule making what the law actually requires and how it 
will operate in practical terms.1 Whenever Congress legislates, it has the option of 
writing detailed laws—what I call dictating—in which case the executive branch will 
have little or no substantive input into policy. Alternatively, Congress can hand off 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“The power 
of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily 
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or 
explicitly, by Congress.” (omission in original) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 
(1974)). Compare MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43056, COUNTING 
REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES 
IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER 6 tbl.1 (2015), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43056.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PG5L-42L6] (noting that federal agencies promulgated 3659 final rules in 
2013), with Drew DeSilver, Congress Ends Least-Productive Year in Recent History, 
PEW RES. CTR: FACT TANK (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013 
/12/23/congress-ends-least-productive-year-in-recent-history/ [https://perma.cc/EA4S-XLEG] 
(noting that Congress enacted only 65 laws in 2013). 
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broad rule-making authority to agencies—what I (like others) call delegating, thus 
giving the executive a substantial role in the policy-making process.2  
Legal scholars and political scientists have puzzled over why lawmakers would 
ever voluntarily cede their power to another branch.3 A benign explanation is that 
legislators delegate when they are too busy to master the intricacies of a complicated 
subject matter and instead choose to defer to the expertise of the administrative 
agency with deeper knowledge of the regulated industry. More sinister stories depict 
Congress as insulating itself from blame or avoiding hard choices by submitting 
targets of control to a “regulatory lottery.”4 This Article examines the 
dictation/delegation choice in the context of securities law.  
To make the stakes concrete, compare the divergent paths of two different 
securities law provisions. Title I of the JOBS Act created a new category of firm, the 
emerging growth company (EGC), with reduced disclosure obligations and other ad-
vantages for firms undertaking an initial public offering (IPO).5 For this provision, 
Congress dictated the precise contours of EGC status and rights—including on issues 
as to which one might expect deference to specialists. For example, Congress itself 
dictated the revenue ceiling a firm could not exceed in order to qualify as an EGC.6 
And the first EGC IPO took place only three weeks after enactment.7  
Contrast with the EGCs the fate of the Volcker Rule. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”) was 
signed on July 21, 2010, and required various agencies to collaborate on a rule to 
prohibit banks from engaging in proprietary trading.8 Regulators presented a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION 
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 52–85 (1999).  
 3. See generally Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of 
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1982); EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 2 
(analyzing Congress’s decision to delegate policy decisions to administrative agencies).  
 4. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 31. 
 5. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 101–08, 126 
Stat. 306, 307–13 (2012); see also Chris Brummer & Daniel Gorfine, The JOBS Act Isn’t All 
‘Crowdfunding,’ FORBES (Oct. 8, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013 
/10/08/the-jobs-act-isnt-all-crowdfunding [https://web.archive.org/web/20160324055714/http:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/10/08/the-jobs-act-isnt-all-crowdfunding/#611a5ab67dc6] 
(summarizing Title I of the JOBS Act). 
 6. Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 5 (noting that Congress defined an EGC as a com-
pany with less than $1 billion in annual revenue). 
 7. The first EGC IPO was initiated on April 25, 2012, David Westenberg, Natural 
Grocers Becomes First EGC To Traverse the IPO On-Ramp to Closing, WILMERHALE (July 
30, 2012), https://www.wilmerhale.com/blog/ipo/post/?id=17179872626 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZF52-VWGN], twenty days after the JOBS Act was enacted on April 5, 2012. Steve 
VanRoekel, The JOBS Act: Encouraging Startups, Supporting Small Businesses, 
WHITE HOUSE: BLOG (Apr. 5, 2012, 4:12 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/04 
/05/jobs-act-encouraging-startups-supporting-small-businesses [https://perma.cc/U8Z7-6RGU].  
 8. See Jennifer Wu, Comment, Morrison v. Dodd-Frank: Deciphering the Congres-
sional Rebuttal to the Supreme Court's Ruling, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 317, 335 (2011) (noting 
that Congress passed “the Dodd-Frank Act on July 10, 2010”); Press Release, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Agencies Issue Final Rules Implementing the Volcker 
Rule (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131210a.htm 
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proposed form of the Volcker Rule on November 7, 2011.9 They gave the public until 
February 13, 2012, to comment on the proposed regulations and ultimately received 
over 17,000 comments.10 The final rule was not released until December 10, 2013,11 
and it was then revised one more time, with the final regulation being approved over 
three and a half years after the legislation was initially signed.12 Moreover, much of 
this rule is still not in effect yet. On December 18, 2014, “the Federal Reserve 
extended the Volcker Rule’s conformance period for ‘legacy covered funds’ [a 
defined term] until July 21, 2016 and indicated it would likely extend the period 
further to July 21, 2017.”13 
The dominant narrative of securities regulation describes a pattern of financial 
boom and bust, followed by “bubble law,” “quack” regulation that is a misguided 
populist reaction with little empirical support.14 In other words, a crisis leads to 
reactionary legislation. This description may be accurate, but it is incomplete, be-
cause Congress sometimes legislates in the securities field in the absence of a 
precipitating crisis. Building on this reality, this Article puts forward a nuanced the-
ory of congressional action in the securities field. The dictation/delegation thesis ex-
plains why and when Congress chooses to retain control over policy and why and 
when it chooses to punt to an agency in the realm of securities regulation.  
Most members of Congress work for reelection, and reelection requires the 
financial support of constituents—particularly constituents that contribute regularly 
and generously to campaigns. These groups logically favor writing their preferences 
directly into the law—that is, dictation—over delegation because legislation can be 
largely self-executing and thus not subject to potentially unwanted administrative 
build-outs. Put simply, in times when the political climate allows for successful 
industry-sponsored legislation, Congress will tend to enact laws directly through 
dictation.  
However, when a securities-related crisis arises, political pressure sometimes 
necessitates congressional intervention. In these cases, industry must play defense, 
and its best strategy for doing so is to channel key decision making to the agency 
                                                                                                                 
 
[https://perma.cc/XK3F-QCTR]. 
 9. Jeffrey L. Hare & Christopher N. Steelman, Federal Regulators Release Volcker Rule 
Final Regulations, DLA PIPER (Dec. 11, 2013), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights 
/publications/2013/12/federal-regulators-release-volcker-rule-final-re__ [https://perma.cc/C57Y 
-SS3E]. 
 10. Craig Torres & Cheyenne Hopkins, Bernanke Says U.S. Volcker Rule Won’t Be Ready 
by July Deadline, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 29, 2012, 1:03 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2012-02-29/bernanke-says-dodd-frank-s-volcker-rule-won-t-be-ready-by-july-21-deadline 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20151020172045/http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02 
-29/bernanke-says-dodd-frank-s-volcker-rule-won-t-be-ready-by-july-21-deadline].  
 11. Hare & Steelman, supra note 9.  
 12. See Torres & Hopkins, supra note 10. 
 13. DAVID HARPEST & JOSHUA HOROWITZ, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, FIRST TAKE: TEN 
KEY POINTS FROM THE FED’S VOLCKER RULE COVERED FUNDS EXTENSION (2014), http:// 
www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/2014-volcker 
-rule-ccovered-funds.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM8M-AYZW]. 
 14. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate 
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2011); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005). 
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level. There, regulation can be delayed, diluted, and, if all else fails, disputed in court. 
Agency action is subject to inevitable delay because of the lengthy notice-and-
comment rule-making process agencies must follow. What’s more, industry groups 
have the time and money to lobby regulators during the rule-making process to shape 
agency choices in ways favorable to their own interests. Finally, the validity of any 
agency rule making can ultimately be challenged in court, whereas direct congres-
sional action is relatively immune from judicial second-guessing. 
Thus, the dictation/delegation thesis proposes that in noncrisis conditions when 
an industry has unitary preferences, it will favor dictation. Moreover, it hypothesizes 
that industry interest groups with a substantial history of campaign contributions and 
lobbying efforts will in noncrisis times succeed in persuading Congress to enact their 
preference for legislation that dictates the details of law—that is, articulates the pre-
cise contours of regulation. I do not mean to suggest a simple and inevitable binary 
world, where delegation necessarily follows crisis and dictation occurs only in 
noncrisis periods. Instead, I suggest that statutes exist along a continuum of dictation 
and delegation and that salient crises play a significant role in determining where 
along that continuum individual enactments fall. For the sake of clarity, I will 
emphasize that by dictation I do not mean dictatorial. Dictation refers to whether 
Congress chooses to make the law self-executing, leaving the agency with virtually 
nothing to do. Delegation is where Congress delegates the question to agency rule 
making—even if it hems in the rule makers with myriad dictatorial suggestions, the 
final contours of the rule are left to the agency’s discretion. 
This Article develops these ideas in six parts. Part I surveys the literature, 
describing how the scholarship on the political economy of securities regulation has 
narrowly focused on postcrisis legislation, at the expense of understanding the larger 
landscape of securities law. The political science and administrative law literatures, 
in contrast, do not consider how salient crises affect Congress’s decision to dictate 
or delegate, nor how Congress’s delegation patterns may wax and wane over time. 
Thus an unanswered question remains at the intersection of these fields: does 
Congress delegate differently in securities law in the wake of crisis? Part II articulates 
the dictation/delegation thesis. Part III offers brief histories of the relevant securities 
laws, including both postcrisis and noncrisis enactments. A word of explanation is 
appropriate here as to my definition of crisis. For the purposes of this study, eco-
nomic malaise is not enough. Crisis legislation is legislation spurred either by a sali-
ent securities or market shock that provides a specific reason for legislators to look 
to securities regulation—as opposed to more general financial stimulus or tax 
policy—as the appropriate response. The Paperwork Crisis of 1967–70, which at its 
height caused Wall Street to suspend trading altogether on Wednesdays, spawned the 
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA) and the Securities Amendments of 
1975.15 The financial fraud uncovered in the wake of the dot-com crash of 2000 
prompted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),16 and the financial crisis of 2008 
produced the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.17 The noncrisis securities legislation includes 
the Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 (SBIIA), National Securities 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 16. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 17. See infra Part III.A.3. 
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Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA), Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 
(SLUSA), and the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (“JOBS Act”).18 
Notably, Silicon Valley players strongly backed four of these five acts.19 
Part IV of the Article tests the dictation/delegation thesis by conducting an 
original empirical study of the extent of delegation of legislation over a forty-five-
year period, from 1970 to 2014. That time period spanned three separate financial 
crises and Congress’s enactment of nine separate pieces of securities legislation. The 
data support the dictation/delegation thesis: more delegation occurs postcrisis. It then 
moves to anticipate two separate objections. One is that party politics offers a better 
explanation for congressional delegation—but the data show that Congress delegates 
more postcrisis, even controlling for divided government. A second potential critique 
is that Congress delegates in times of crisis because it has much less time to educate 
itself. But, with the exception of 1970’s SIPA and SOX, all of the “crisis” legislation 
is more accurately characterized as “postcrisis” in nature. Each was in a state of 
equilibrium, seeking to address the root problems of the precipitating crisis so that it 
would not happen again.20 Thus, there was ample time for dictating specific 
policies—if Congress had wished to do so. 
As Part V explains, a more granular analysis of legislative acts reveals the 
limitations of the thesis. Most notably, the JOBS Act contains extensive delegations, 
even though it was not passed in response to a salient financial crisis. Because no 
scholar has yet examined the political economy of the JOBS Act, Part V.B looks 
closely at that subject, and the results are revealing. Three of the JOBS Act’s titles 
were backed by Silicon Valley or by sophisticated financial institutions.21 These titles 
contain minimal delegation.22 In contrast, relative political novices backed two of the 
other titles of the JOBS Act, and in the last one its initial advocates signaled an assent 
to delegation to the SEC—perhaps because of formidable adverse interests in the 
form of state securities law administrators.23 These titles contain more substantial 
delegation. Indeed, the crowdfunding title contains the second-highest number of 
delegations of any title in the sample.24  
I. THE EXISTING LITERATURE 
There are two standard accounts of the political economy that can apply to federal 
securities regulation. The first focuses on securities regulation itself, and on a particu-
lar aspect of it: it posits that Congress reacts to crisis by producing “bubble laws.” 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
 19. SBIIA was backed by Heizer Corporation, a venture capital fund. See infra 
Part III.B.1. PLSRA and SLUSA were backed by Silicon Valley actors. See infra Part III.B.2. 
The JOBS Act was largely backed by Silicon Valley actors. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 20. See infra Part III.A (describing securities-related crises and Congress’s responses to them). 
 21. Silicon Valley actors backed Title I. See discussion infra Part III.B.4. SecondMarket, 
a sophisticated financial institution, backed Title V. See infra Part V.B.1.b. Small banks sup-
ported the passage of Title VI. See infra Part V.B.1.c. 
 22. See infra Part V.B.1.  
 23. See infra Part V.B.2.  
 24. See infra Part V.B.2.b. 
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As to the second, it holds that Congress will delegate more in some fields than in 
others. Both of these accounts fall short in distinct ways: On one hand, securities law 
scholars have not sufficiently accounted for either the larger history of securities law 
or the crucial question of the degree to which a particular law delegates policy-
making agency. On the other hand, the delegation literature has failed to account for 
the possibility that Congress may alternate between dictation and delegation in a 
given subject matter. Moreover, this literature overlooks the field of securities law 
entirely. This Part will offer a brief survey of both accounts.  
First, a dominant narrative in the legal academy views congressional securities 
regulation as problematic “quackery,” “bubble laws” produced in times of crisis by 
a foolish Congress that cares nothing for empiricism.25 Part A will describe the argu-
ments of these academics, most notably Roberta Romano, Stephen Bainbridge, and 
Larry Ribstein. Their pointed critiques are incisive but ultimately limited because 
they focus solely on postcrisis laws—most notably, Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank. Panning back to examine the broader history of securities regulation reveals 
that Congress does not always legislate in reaction to crisis in the securities arena. 
Sometimes it intervenes in the securities realm in a noncrisis context, and when it 
does, it is much more likely to spell out the details of the law, delegating relatively 
little to agencies.  
Part B examines the delegation literature. Both administrative law scholars and 
political scientists have focused on the important question of when and why Congress 
delegates to administrative agencies. Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gelhorn, and Glen O. 
Robinson’s foundational article addressed when a legislature might want to delegate 
to an agency—either to defer to bureaucratic expertise or to deflect politically sensi-
tive questions to the agency level.26 Matthew C. Stephenson used models to predict 
when Congress might delegate to agency or to courts.27  
There is an underlying premise to these treatments that goes unspoken—namely, 
from the constituent’s perspective, delegation is always second-best. The best-case 
scenario is not to delegate at all—to have one’s preferences encoded directly into 
legislation, free from the risks of delay, dilution, and disputation that Part II will 
address.  
Unlike the securities scholars, political scientists David Epstein and Sharyn 
O'Halloran focus on the degree of delegation a statute contains. Indeed, they con-
struct a complicated model after coding 257 statutes to measure the extent of delega-
tion in various categories of legislation.28 Their analysis, however, suffers from a 
high degree of generality because the researchers collapse a diverse range of financial 
regulation into a single overarching descriptive category, “Banking and Finance.”29 
They fail to identify securities regulation as a category at all.30 More importantly, 
their self-professed goal is to determine substantive areas where Congress delegates 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 1784; Romano, supra note 14. 
 26. See Aranson et al., supra note 3, at 5–7. 
 27. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, 
Risk, and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1036 (2006). 
 28. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 89. 
 29. See id. at 202.  
 30. Id. 
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relatively more or less.31 Their account is thus categorical and static: they do not 
account for the possibility that within a single area Congress might oscillate between 
dictation and delegation or for why that might be. 
A. Legal Literature on the Politics of Securities Regulation 
The standard narrative of financial regulation describes a “centuries-old cycle” of 
boom, bubble, bust, and regulatory response.32 As a result, federal regulation inevita-
bly expands after “significant economic turmoil.”33 Larry Ribstein, Stuart Banner, 
and others have traced this recurring pattern as far back as the South Sea Bubble of 
172034 and the Future Trading Act of 1921, which followed “the most severe reces-
sion in the United States up to that time.”35 The Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 followed the 1929 stock market crash and ensuing 
Great Depression.36 SOX responded to the downturn of 2000 and the accompanying 
bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom.37 Dodd-Frank was an attempt to address the 
financial crisis of 2008.38 Indeed, this pattern of financial crisis and regulation played 
out in both the United States and the United Kingdom in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries.39  
John C. Coates observes that this legislative cycle is natural.40 After a salient 
crisis, “[e]ven if [the] legislative response[] [is] bad for the public,” politicians bene-
fit as long as the problem is complicated and the legislation has a chance to solve the 
problem.41 He observes that “[a]ction allows politicians to show they can ‘do some-
thing’ while inaction requires politicians to defend a status quo tainted in the voting 
public's mind by the salient fact of market downturn or scandal.”42 
Four preeminent corporate law scholars have addressed this legislative pattern in 
important articles. Three of them, Roberta Romano, Larry Ribstein, and Stephen 
Bainbridge, decry financial regulation in response to crisis as “bubble law” or 
“quackery.”43 The fourth, John Coffee, defends postcrisis regulation, arguing that 
any excesses are ultimately leavened by agency action in a pattern he dubs the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. See id. at 197 (describing how the chapter divides legislation into categories to deter-
mine if Congress delegates more in “policy areas shrouded in uncertainty”). 
 32. Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 77–78 (2003). 
 33. Romano, supra note 14, at 1591.  
 34. Ribstein, supra note 32, at 94–95. 
 35. Romano, supra note 14, at 1591; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy 
of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk 
Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2012). 
 36. See Romano, supra note 14, at 1592. 
 37. Coffee, supra note 35, at 1020; Romano, supra note 14, at 1523. 
 38. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 1020. 
 39. See Romano, supra note 14, at 1593 (citing Stuart Banner’s historical research). 
 40. See John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A 
Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 569 (2001) (“When crashes, scandals 
and recessions occur together, as they have in the past, the pressure (or opportunity) for politi-
cians to act is most acute.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 14; Ribstein, supra note 32; Romano, supra note 14. 
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“regulatory sine curve.”44 Thus, the accepted perspective is that Congress legislates 
following crisis, and it does so to regulate. Coffee defends what the other three de-
nounce, but all four agree on the underlying cycle. These four scholars do not address 
how and when a deregulatory legislative agenda could ever gain purchase in 
Congress—as it did, for example, in the JOBS Act.45 
Professor Romano accepts the pattern as descriptively accurate—although she 
laments it. She explains that “financial exigencies embolden critics of markets to 
push their regulatory agenda. They are able to play on the strand of popular opinion 
that is hostile to speculation and markets because the general public is more amenable 
to regulation after experiencing financial losses.”46 The unhappy result is “quack 
corporate governance,” passed in crisis and unsupported by empirical evidence.47 
Because she suggests that regulation works as a one-way ratchet, her policy prescrip-
tion is for mandatory sunset provisions. At least with such a legislative check, cooler 
heads can prevail in due course and dial back the populist excesses of postcrisis 
legislation.48  
Professor Larry Ribstein termed the legislative product of this regulatory cycle 
“bubble laws”:  
 In normal and boom times, new regulation would not help any distinct 
group enough to motivate the group to push for it. . . . 
 Crashes destabilize this interest group equilibrium in several ways. 
First, the more marginal firms, start-ups, and others that profited from 
the boom and opposed regulation that might thwart it, are now financially 
too weak to have much political clout. Second, pro-regulatory forces can 
enlist new supporters by arguing that regulation would restore “investor 
confidence”—code for more buyers and therefore higher prices. Third, 
reformers can draw on populism and envy of the rich, which abates only 
as long as the rich generate significant wealth for the rest of us.49 
Professor Stephen M. Bainbridge performed a similar post-mortem on Dodd-
Frank, judging it, too, to be a “bubble law.”50  
 In ordinary times, Washington typically has more important issues on 
its plate than corporate governance. In a bubble period, moreover, federal 
regulatory action is even less likely because interest groups like 
shareholders and consumers may be lulled into inaction by the seemingly 
ever-rising value of their portfolios. . . . When the bubble inevitably 
                                                                                                                 
 
 44. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 1029 (“This Article’s fundamental premise is that a 
‘Regulatory Sine Curve’ governs the intensity of the oversight exercised by financial regulators.”).  
 45. To be fair, Bainbridge does in other work acknowledge deregulatory tendencies. See 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between 
Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1603 (1999). 
 46. Romano, supra note 25, at 1593. 
 47. Id. at 1529.  
 48. See id. at 1593. (“A regulatory agenda, in short, does not generate popular support in 
a booming market.”).  
 49. Ribstein, supra note 32, at 79 (footnote omitted). 
 50. Bainbridge, supra note 25, at 1784.  
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bursts, investigators reviewing the rubble begin to turn up evidence of 
speculative excess and even outright, rampant fraud. Investors burnt by 
losses from the breaking of the bubble and outraged by evidence of 
misconduct by corporate insiders and financial bigwigs create populist 
pressure for new regulation.51 
Professor John C. Coffee responded to the Romano-Ribstein-Bainbridge critique 
in The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be 
Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated.52 Coffee’s analysis begins with an ac-
ceptance of Romano’s premise that “Congress seems to only pass securities and 
financial reform legislation after a crash or similar crisis[.]”53 For Coffee, however, 
this pattern is not fraught with illegitimacy and quack legislation—rather, it is reflec-
tive of salutary republican self-government.54 He brands Romano, Ribstein, and 
Bainbridge as members of a “Tea Party Caucus,” whose first tenet is “Congress 
should not legislate after a market crash, because the result will be a ‘Bubble Law’ 
that crudely overregulates.”55  
Coffee does not deny that republican self-government can produce overreaction 
in congressional treatment of securities laws. But he downplays this risk by arguing 
that administrative rule making can correct the excesses of postcrisis regulation.56 He 
dubs this mellowing influence the “Regulatory Sine Curve.”57 One example should 
suffice.58 Section 956 of Dodd-Frank required “covered financial institution[s] to 
disclose . . . the structures of all incentive-based compensation” paid to officers, di-
rectors and employees that “could lead to material financial loss to the covered fi-
nancial institution.”59 While the legislative language could have required specific 
disclosures regarding the compensation of numerous individuals, including the very 
kinds of traders whose speculation led to the downfall of Barings Bank and massive 
losses at Societe Generale, the principal financial regulators jointly adopted rules that 
favored generalized narrative over quantitative data and left to the individual fi-
nancial institution the calculus of which of its employees could cause a material 
financial loss.60  
The battle lines are thus clear: Bainbridge, Romano, and Ribstein condemn 
congressional intervention in business law, advocating for increased state power, 
sunsets, and other measures to curb excessive regulatory legislation. Opposing them, 
Coffee argues that postcrisis financial regulation is a positive feature of representa-
tive democracy and that administrative agencies can temper any particularly 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. Id. at 1785 (footnotes omitted). 
 52. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 1019–20. 
 53. Id. at 1021.  
 54. See id. at 1022. 
 55. Id. at 1024.  
 56. See id. at 1037. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., id. at 1065–78 (surveying the Regulatory Sine Curve as demonstrated by the 
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act).  
 59. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 956(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1905 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2012)).  
 60. Coffee, supra note 35, at 1069–70.  
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egregious law. Despite their deep philosophical differences, however, all four schol-
ars agree on the fundamental premise: at the level of federal legislation, law follows 
crisis. 
But that is not always true. The JOBS Act of 201261 was not enacted in response 
to a crisis, and it marks a radical deregulation in securities law. Consider these 
specifics: 
 Title I makes it easier for “emerging growth companies”—as defined, almost 
all companies—to go public.62 Once public, it grants them relief from many 
normal disclosure requirements for up to five years.63 
 Title II for the first time since 1933 allows private firms to solicit investors 
from the general public.64 
 Title III for the first time allows private firms to accept investments from 
average investors.65 
 Title IV raises the limit on funds that private firms can raise funds from $5 
million to $50 million.66 
 Title V raises the number of shareholders a firm can have while still remaining 
private from 500 to 2000.67 
 Title VI allows public banks to go private with as many as 1200 shareholders, 
quadrupling the pre-JOBS-Act requirement of 300 shareholders.68 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 101, 126 Stat. 
306, 307 (2012). 
 62. See Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 5. 
 63. See § 101(a), 126 Stat at 307 (granting “emerging growth company” status until the 
earliest of a few dates including “the last day of the fiscal year . . . following the fifth 
anniversary of the date . . . pursuant to an effective registration”). 
 64. See Chance Barnett, The Crowdfunder’s Guide to General Solicitation and Title II of 
the JOBS Act, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett 
/2013/09/23/the-crowdfunders-guide-to-general-solicitation-title-ii-of-the-jobs-act [http://web 
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Title II). 
 65. See Chance Barnett, JOBS Act Title III: Investment Being Democratized, Moving 
Online, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2013 9:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett 
/2013/10/23/sec-jobs-act-title-iii-investment-being-democratized-moving-online [http://web 
.archive.org/web/20161203041258/http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/10/23/sec 
-jobs-act-title-iii-investment-being-democratized-moving-online/#56627e68346e] (describing 
Title III).  
 66. Kendall Almerico, SEC: Startups Can Now Raise $50 Million in ‘Mini IPO,’ 
ENTREPRENEUR (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/244278 [https://perma.cc 
/4BHR-MUCW]. 
 67. Susan Beblavi, Note, JOBS Act Title V: Raising Threshold for Registration, 90 DENV. 
U. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63 (2013). 
 68. § 601, 126 Stat at 326 (amending shareholder threshold for registration from 300 to 
1200 for a “bank or bank holding company”). 
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The JOBS Act, then, came as a fundamental deregulation of securities law. In 
their “bubble law” critique, Romano, Ribstein, and Bainbridge do not discuss the 
possibility of democratic forces that act to deregulate, rather than impose new regula-
tions.69 Nevertheless, even before the JOBS Act, Congress passed such laws in 1980, 
1995, 1996, and 1998.70 
To be fair, Coffee is, for reasons of timing, the only one of these scholars who 
even had the chance to theorize the JOBS Act. But rather than acknowledging its 
importance, he swept the Act into his larger regulatory-sine-curve theory:  
Above all, this episode shows again that, once a crisis passes, Congress 
can easily be persuaded to repeal legislation that it passed in response to 
the crisis. This proves not that the original legislation was flawed, but 
more that Congress can be manipulated, has a limited attention span, and 
will sometimes accept makeweight arguments, particularly in an election 
year.71 
Coffee’s realist treatment of the JOBS Act misses its distinctive position as a 
freestanding deregulatory law. His regulatory sine curve story focused exclusively 
on administrative agency-, judiciary-, and industry-based actions that loosened the 
regulatory requirements.72 It was agency implementation that sheathed the sword of 
Dodd-Frank section 956. With the JOBS Act Congress acted to deregulate—a 
distinctive type of deregulation that the conventional securities law narrative does 
not contemplate.73 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. Bainbridge’s other work paints a more nuanced picture of the political landscape and 
acknowledges that Congress can also pass deregulatory reform if it is ambitious enough to 
animate “Main Street.” See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 
18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 704 n.160 (1995). 
 70. See infra Part III.B (identifying and discussing securities legislation passed in the ab-
sence of crisis). 
 71. Coffee, supra note 35, at 1078. 
 72. See id. at 1030 (“The key implication of the Regulatory Sine Curve is not that legisla-
tion is futile, but that erosion of the statute's commands will predictably begin shortly after its 
passage.”). 
 73. Coffee gives three instances of agency pullback from the congressional directions of 
SOX. First, although in SOX section 402 Congress prohibited company loans to executives, a 
group of twenty-five major law firms “released a memorandum explaining how they would 
interpret [the law] and the SEC quietly acquiesced.” Id. at 1042. Coffee opined that “the bar 
simply replaced the SEC as the authoritative interpreter of the statute's meaning.” Id. Second, 
Coffee details how Sarbanes-Oxley’s most onerous provision, section 404(b)’s despised 
internal-control-audit requirement, was actually imposed by PCAOB, not Congress at all. Id. 
at 1038. Eventually the SEC and the PCAOB separately acted to mitigate the effects of section 
404 on smaller companies. See id. at 1038–41. Third, while pursuant to the directives of SOX 
section 307 the SEC adopted standards of conduct for attorneys appearing before it, there has 
been “[t]otal silence” in SEC enforcement, “[d]espite numerous instances in which lawyers 
were clearly aware of executive misconduct.” Id. at 1044. 
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B. The Delegation Literature 
While securities law scholars have focused on “bubble” legislation, administrative 
law scholars and political scientists have focused on the more general question of 
congressional delegation. Public choice theorists of administrative law have con-
cerned themselves with when legislators might choose to delegate to the agency.74 
Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson describe both managerial explanations for delega-
tion—where Congress delegates for benign reasons such as reducing workloads, 
deferring to agency expertise, and assuring continuity of decision makers75—and 
political explanations, most notably where delegation removes a politically sensitive 
question to the less political and more “rational” agency forum.76 In the end, Aronson 
et al. take a more cynical view, explaining delegation as a means for members of 
Congress to deliver private benefits to their constituents.77 Later work has attempted 
to model how legislators might weigh the choice between delegating to an agency 
versus delegating to the courts.78  
Political scientists also have focused on why Congress often delegates in practice. 
In general terms, they offer three reasons as to why Congress delegates in some areas 
rather than others. First, Congress delegates to promote relationships with 
constituents—to free up legislator time for service to constituents, to allow legislators 
to play the role of ombudsman for the constituent subject to the vagaries of agency 
bureaucracy, and maybe even to form a sort of “protection racket” where constituents 
who fail to contribute to the legislator’s campaign may be threatened with un-
appealing regulation.79 Second, a “regulatory lottery” may exist; on this view, when 
interest groups clash, they may prefer to take their chances with an agency rather 
than risk a costly battle for a particular outcome in the legislature.80 The third posits 
that delegation allows for a legislative “win-win” in cases where a large group can 
be appeased that the agency will act “in the public interest” and more concentrated 
interest groups can lobby the agency to promulgate regulations favorable to them.81 
Epstein and O’Halloran articulate the most robust delegation theory in their book, 
Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under 
Separate Powers.82 They ask simply: “[W]hy does Congress delegate broad authority 
to the executive in some policy areas and not in others?”83 Their answer to this 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. See Aranson et al., supra note 3, at 5. 
 75. Id. at 21; see also EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 29. 
 76. Aranson et al., supra note 3, at 25.  
 77. Id. at 63. Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson argue that such delegation is improper, 
and that the nondelegation doctrine should constrain Congress more. See id. (“The delegation 
of legislative authority to agencies, which facilitates the regulatory production of private bene-
fits . . . has been a growing problem . . . . A renewed nondelegation doctrine that limits the 
original legislative delegations as well as any subsequent agency assumption of legislative 
power, however, should reduce the use of regulation to produce private benefits . . . .”). 
 78. Stephenson, supra note 27, at 1036. 
 79. EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN, supra note 2, at 30–31. 
 80. Id. at 31. 
 81. Id. at 32. 
 82. Id. at xv (introducing a summary of the book’s content in the preface). 
 83. Id. at 7. 
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question is built around a “transaction cost politics” theory.84 Analogizing to the 
familiar question confronting firms as to whether to “make or buy,” Epstein and 
O’Halloran argue that legislators will sometimes “make” legislation themselves 
(that is, dictate exactly what the law will be) and at other times “buy” it from outside 
(that is, delegate to the executive).85 Epstein and O’Halloran predict that the dictate-
or-delegate decision “will be made in such a way as to maximize legislators’ political 
goals”—that is, reelection.86 
Epstein and O’Halloran test their theory by way of a large sample of important 
legislation from 1947 to 1990.87 Their model yields several more detailed predic-
tions, which they test on their sample.88 But they do not separate out securities laws 
as a distinct category.89 And more problematically, they look at each issue area as a 
whole, comparing, for example, the extent to which Congress delegates in tax law 
versus environmental law.90 They do not examine variation in delegation between 
statutes in the same issue area.91 Thus, they cannot account for why, in a single sub-
ject matter area, Congress might sometimes delegate and sometimes dictate.  
Thus, a brief survey of the existing literature reveals the gap that this Article seeks 
to fill. The theory, explicated in the next section, is that the dominant securities law 
narrative tells only a third of the story. Yes, Congress acts postcrisis—but it also acts 
in the absence of crisis. Moreover, the nature of its legislation—more precisely, of 
its delegation—varies depending on whether a crisis precipitated it. 
II. THE DICTATION VS. DELEGATION THESIS 
Legislators seek to maximize their chances of reelection.92 Reelection requires the 
backing of constituents that can mobilize support at the ballot box or can contribute 
the money that campaigns require. Thus, legislators care the most about constituents 
most likely to help them with reelection—those that contribute to the officeholder’s 
campaign and have regularly done so in the past. All things being equal, then, repeat 
players fare better than single-issue constituents that seek a targeted intervention in 
politics.93 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. Id. at 7–9. 
 85. See id. at 7 (“[W]hen deciding where policy will be made, Congress trades off the 
internal policy production costs of the committee system against the external costs of delega-
tion. Thus, Congress’s decision to delegate is similar to a firm’s make-or-buy decision . . . .”). 
 86. Id. at 9. 
 87. Id. at 87 (introducing the data set based on Mayhew’s list of important legislation). 
See generally id. at 86–120. 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 196–231 (dividing legislation into different subject areas and discuss-
ing whether Congress delegates more in particular areas of law). 
 89. Id. at 199. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 47. “Since legislators’ primary goal is reelection, it follows that policy will be 
made in such a way as to maximize legislators’ reelection chances; delegation will follow the 
natural fault lines of legislators’ political advantage.” Id. 
 93. Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974). Galanter first introduced the key distinction 
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The dictation/delegation thesis posits that, in general, legislators will dictate and 
delegate according to constituents’ preferences—particularly the preferences of 
those constituents who are wealthy and politically active. In general, when industry 
has unitary preferences, a history of active campaign and political action committee 
contributions, and effective lobbying machinery, its preference is for legislation that 
dictates the details of law—that is, that articulates the precise contours of regulation. 
Thus, in times when the political climate allows for successful industry-sponsored 
legislation, the first best option for Congress is dictation rather than delegation.  
In contrast, following a salient crisis, industry will play defense rather than 
offense. Its lobbying then focuses on minimizing the deleterious impact of inevitable 
legislation by shifting regulation as much as possible to the agency level. This strat-
egy may be characterized as delay, dilute, and dispute. Agency action is by its nature 
slow, subject to lobbying, and vulnerable to challenge in the courts. 
The balance of this Article will explore the manifestation of dictation and 
delegation in securities law over time, but one important caveat must precede that 
discussion. The securities law landscape is complicated. I do not intend to reduce it 
to a simple formula, whereby crisis necessarily precipitates delegation and noncrisis 
always prompts dictation. On the contrary, Part V will elaborate on statutes that do 
not neatly fit the dictation/delegation pattern. It is enough to suggest that the question 
of delegation is of fundamental concern in understanding the broad scope of securi-
ties regulation, and that we can discern revealing patterns in delegation over time. 
A few examples from recent law show how much the delegation question matters. 
First, consider the inherent delay that delegation entails. Upon delegation, the agency 
must study the question and propose rules to the public.94 Merely formulating rules 
to propose takes much time. For example, Title III of the JOBS Act required the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to propose rules within 270 days after 
enactment, which would have been December 31, 2012.95 Thus, the statute itself 
contemplated a nine-month delay. But the real-world delay was far longer: the 
agency did not even propose rules until October 2013, ten months after its 
congressionally imposed deadline.96 In addition, once the agency proposes a rule, it 
is subject to a notice-and-comment period, after which the agency must craft a final 
                                                                                                                 
 
between repeat players and one-shotters. Id. at 97–98. Galanter’s insight was in the litigation 
realm, but his insights have traction in the political realm as well. 
 94. See Emily S. Bremer, A Primer on the Informal Rulemaking Process, ADMIN. 
CONF. U.S.: ADMIN. FIX (May 10, 2013, 11:56 AM), https://www.acus.gov/newsroom 
/administrative-fix-blog/primer-informal-rulemaking-process [https://perma.cc/QS6U-4CNV] 
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impracticable. Edward Rubin, It’s Time To Make the Administrative Procedure Act 
Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107 (2003). 
 95. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(c), 126 Stat. 
306, 320 (2012). 
 96. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfunding (Oct. 
23, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540017677 [https:// 
perma.cc/3F46-HWG3]. 
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rule that reflects a responsiveness to the public’s input.97 Hence, by its very nature, 
reform delegated is reform delayed. 
Delay is not the only distinguishing feature of agency action; dilution can and 
often does occur at the agency level. While the SEC prepares its draft regulation, 
industry advocates can lobby to weaken any proposed reforms.98 In the field of finan-
cial regulation, Professor Kimberly Krawiec conducted a groundbreaking study of 
federal regulators with various interest groups during the preproposal period for the 
Volcker Rule and found that financial institutions met with regulators 351 times, 
accounting for 78% of all such meetings.99 During the same time period, public 
interest, labor, research, and advocacy groups met with these same regulators a total 
of only thirty-one times.100 Krawiec found that “financial institutions, financial 
industry trade groups, and law firms representing such institutions and trade groups 
collectively accounted for 93.1% of all federal agency Volcker Rule meetings, 
whereas public interest, research, advocacy, and labor groups, and other persons and 
organizations, accounted for only 6.9%.”101 
While the meeting logs reveal only the incidence of the meetings, we can presume 
that in the course of the 351 times where financial industry representatives met with 
agency officials, they often advocated for positions favorable to their clients—
positions that likely represented a dilution of Congress’s regulatory intent in Dodd-
Frank. The potential for such lobbying is a key feature of agency action; in contrast, 
if the law is self-executing, there is no need (or opportunity) to lobby further. 
Credit risk retention under Dodd-Frank provides another example of dilution. In 
Dodd-Frank section 941, Congress sought to prevent banks from making subprime 
loans and securitizing them to palm all of the attendant risks of default onto investors 
by requiring that they retain some default risk on their balance sheets. But section 
941 contained an exception for qualified residential mortgages (QRM), and Joshua 
White details how the housing and mortgage industries pushed back on the definition 
of QRMs, to the point that regulators reproposed the rule, which was diluted to the 
point of (in the words of Barney Frank) “effectively abolishing risk retention.”102  
Even without direct, industry lobbying, the SEC itself may be sympathetic to 
industry calls for deregulation or modulated regulation. Professor John Coates has 
argued that in times of crisis it functions as a “political circuit breaker,” softening 
                                                                                                                 
 
 97. Bremer, supra note 94. 
 98. See Elizabeth Shell, Which Federal Agencies Do Lobbyists Target Most?, PBS.ORG 
(June 13, 2014, 3:21 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/agencies-lobbies-target/ 
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 99. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of 
Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 79–80 (2013). 
 100. Id. at 80. Krawiec notes, “This is nearly the same number of times that a single finan-
cial institution—J.P. Morgan Chase—met with federal agencies on Volcker Rule interpreta-
tion and implementation.” Id. 
 101. Id. at 80.  
 102. Joshua T. White, The Evolving Role of Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking, 50 
GA. L. REV. 293, 317–20, 323 (2015). 
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external pressures to regulate.103 Professor Donald Langevoort likewise observes that 
action by the SEC may offer cover to Congress in the face of scandal by providing 
“illusory regulation” that leads the public to believe that more investor protection 
exists than is justified in reality.104 And, in the “normal” political periods when 
securities-related topics are not on the “public agenda,” the SEC will likely be more 
attuned to interest groups like corporations, large investors, investment banks, 
venture capital funds, and Wall Street law firms than to the general electorate.105  
Finally, if the SEC engages in unwelcome rule making, industry can dispute 
agency action in court. Take the case of proxy access. Reformers have long argued 
that the corporate ballot gives no real choice to shareholders.106 Elections are not 
contested: while shareholders can approve or disapprove management’s nominees, 
they cannot include their own.107 Section 971 of Dodd-Frank resolved a long-
standing dispute about SEC authority to regulate in the realm of proxy access by 
granting the SEC the power to require public companies to include shareholder nomi-
nees in the corporate ballot.108 Proxy-access reformers in 2010 would have been justi-
fied in expecting that the resulting SEC rules would finally make proxy access a 
reality.  
Yet in Business Roundtable v. SEC,109 the D.C. Circuit applied rigorous cost-
benefit analysis to the SEC’s final rules on proxy access and rejected them as “arbi-
trary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).110 According 
to the Court, the SEC “inconsistently and opportunistically framed the costs and 
benefits of the rule; failed adequately to quantify the certain costs or to explain why 
those costs could not be quantified; neglected to support its predictive judgments; 
contradicted itself; and failed to respond to substantial problems raised by comment-
ers.”111 Moreover, the Court came to this conclusion despite the significant amount 
of cost-benefit analysis the SEC actually undertook when drafting the rule. 
Thus, if delay and dilution are not enough to make agency action more palatable, 
industry can dispute it in court. Even if the agency relies on empirical research in 
support of its action, a court may second-guess and ultimately overturn it as arbitrary 
and capricious.112 In contrast, congressional legislation is all but immune from judi-
cial review. 
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Delegation matters because any matter delegated to an administrative agency can 
be delayed, diluted, and ultimately disputed; matters as to which Congress itself dic-
tates the law cannot. The dictation/delegation thesis predicts that in noncrisis condi-
tions, where industry has unified preferences, Congress will dictate more; whereas 
in conditions where financial crisis is salient, Congress will delegate more. But cave-
ats are in order. First, the dictation/delegation thesis speaks to general trends rather 
than hard-and-fast rules. There may well be instances of delegation in a noncrisis 
environment and occasions of postcrisis dictation. Moreover, there may be times 
when industry does not unite around a given policy. For example, as Aranson, 
Gellhorn, and Robinson argue, even in noncrisis times, if different repeat players 
favor conflicting positions, legislators may well delegate as a way to avoid affronting 
either side. Thus, the best prospects for dictating legislation occur when there is no 
instigating crisis and repeat players coalesce around a common policy goal. 
The dictation/delegation thesis offers significant advances over the prior 
literature. From the securities regulation side, it offers more holistic method for 
evaluating legislation. Ribstein’s critique of the political ramifications of boom-and-
bust financial cycles is powerful but one-sided. Recall that he described a precrash 
regulatory equilibrium state in the following way: 
[N]ew regulation would not help any distinct group enough to motivate 
the group to push for it. Regulated entities therefore have enough clout 
to defeat significant increases in liability or regulation. Those who might 
shift the balance, such as consumers or investors, do not see a need for 
new regulation while they are riding a rising market.113  
Yet in reality, regulation—or deregulation—does occur in boom times, and the 
dictation/delegation theory predicts that it will be of a distinctly dictating character. 
Particularly if industry’s preferences are unitary and it has the political power to 
muscle through legislation in periods of economic expansion, regulatory changes (or, 
in the case of securities law, deregulation) that do occur are more likely to be set in 
congressional stone. 
The dictation/delegation thesis challenges the delegation literature as well, 
moving past the generalization that Congress consistently dictates or delegates to 
administrative agencies in a given field. To be clear, it is of great interest and im-
portance to be able to characterize the relative amount of delegation to agencies in 
the fields of immigration versus consumer-protection legislation, to take but two 
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examples. Yet it is equally important to understand how and why, within a particular 
field, the forces of dictation and delegation modulate over time.  
This Part has articulated a theory of dictation and delegation in securities 
regulation. What remains is to test it. The remainder of this Article will do so. The 
first order of business is to identify and describe the recent history of congressional 
securities regulation, grouped in terms of crisis and noncrisis legislation. The time 
period begins with SIPA and the Securities Amendments of 1975, which were among 
the most far reaching since the 1934 Securities Exchange Act up until that time. I 
first describe both the content and the political context of postcrisis securities legisla-
tion. I then move to noncrisis securities legislation. With the benefit of this history-
in-a-nutshell of securities law, I can describe my methodology for coding instances 
of congressional delegation and present my findings. 
III. SECURITIES LEGISLATION 1970 TO PRESENT DAY 
A. Postcrisis 
During the time period of 1970–2014 three crises arose that spurred Congress to 
enact new securities laws: the Paperwork Crisis of 1967–70; the accounting fraud 
scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and other firms after the bursting of the 2000 internet 
stock market bubble; and the financial crisis of 2008.  
1. The Paperwork Crisis of 1967–70, the Securities Investor Protection Act of 
1970, and the Securities Act Amendments of 1975 
The Paperwork Crisis of 1967–70 likely has escaped the attention of most 
readers.114 But it nearly crippled Wall Street, and its root cause lay in an utterly mun-
dane problem: paper.  
In the 1960s, stock trades required the physical delivery of a stock certificate 
—that is, an actual piece of paper.115 “In the 1950s, [the] average daily volume [of 
trading] on the New York Stock Exchange had been 2.1 million shares.”116 Then, 
during the 1960s, the volume of trading exploded. From 1960 to 1965, average 
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volume doubled to 4.4 million shares per day.117 By the end of 1967, the total volume 
of trading increased 33.3% over the prior year.118  
The existing system simply could not handle this rapid increase in trading volume, 
and the situation reached crisis levels: by mid-1967, the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) Board of Governors began closing the exchange early to give members a 
chance to deal with the accumulated paperwork.119 Beginning on January 22 of 1968, 
trading was limited to between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m.120 In July and 
August of 1968, the NYSE shut down completely—that is, ceased trading alto-
gether—every Wednesday.121 The crisis caused a “wave” of failures of broker-
dealers,122 with “over 100 NYSE member firms [going] out of business” between 
1968 and 1970.123 Additionally, the NYSE itself spent over $130 million bailing out 
firms and their customers.124 A House Committee Report did not mince words in 
declaring that the Paperwork Crisis “brought our Nation’s securities market to its 
knees.”125  
Both the financial and political systems mobilized to respond to the crisis. 
Industry members coordinated a technological response, while Congress provided a 
federal backstop to reassure the customers of brokerage firms.126 First, Wall Street 
CEOs formed BASIC, the Banking and Securities Industry Committee, to deal with 
the crisis.127 Ultimately, they created the Central Certificate Service, the precursor to 
the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), to create a modern 
technological solution to the problems that precipitated the Paperwork Crisis.128 
At the same time, and in consultation with the SEC, Congress enacted SIPA, 
which created the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC).129 The SIPC 
assured investors that, even if their broker-dealer failed, their money was safe, thus 
providing insurance to brokerage clients comparable to that provided by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to bank depositors.130 This quick response to 
the crisis served to reassure customers not to abandon broker-dealers entirely. In 
addition, the committees with jurisdiction over the securities industry promised 
Congress to begin studying the causes of the crisis with an eye toward recommending 
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further legislation.131 Hearings began in the House in August 1971, and the SEC 
convened hearings later that year.132 After five years, these efforts produced the 
Securities Amendments of 1975. The buildup to this legislative reform involved 
extensive lobbying by both the NYSE and the Securities Industry Association.133 
Along the way, because of a series of scandals concerning the trading of municipal 
bonds, provisions that addressed this market were incorporated into the legislative 
package.134  
The Paperwork Crisis thus prompted not one but two pieces of legislation. The 
first, SIPA, came at the end of the crisis and addressed the immediate problem of 
reassuring investors that if their broker-dealer failed they would not lose their invest-
ments.135 And part of the bargain that produced this limited intervention was a de 
facto agreement by the industry that some form of more comprehensive regulation 
would follow.  
How do these historical developments fit together with the dictation/delegation 
thesis? There was little delegation in the SIPA of 1970 and a high degree of 
delegation—indeed, the most of any of the acts in the sample time period—in the 
Amendments of 1975. This outcome, as Part IV will show, in fact may fit comforta-
bly with the dictation/delegation thesis. SIPA represents the one time in the sample 
period where Congress truly acted to stop a crisis as it was unfolding—and it acted 
by dictating a concrete solution, the creation of the SIPC. The many delegations of 
the later 1975 Amendments reflects the more familiar pattern of heavy delegation 
that occurs once the triggering crisis has passed into recent history.  
2. Enron, WorldCom, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
Professor Romano’s 2005 article on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“Sarbanes-Oxley” 
or SOX) depicts the crisis state that spurred congressional action in these terms:  
After declining from July 2001 through shortly before Enron's financial 
restatements and collapse in the fall of that year, the market plunged 
starting in April 2002, with the S&P reaching bottom in July 2002. The 
low point, which represented more than a one-third loss in value of the 
index over the preceding year, occurred on the day before the conference 
committee reported out a bill (July 23), which was also the second trad-
ing day after the bankruptcy filing of WorldCom (it filed on a weekend). 
Congress was therefore operating in an environment in which investor 
losses were staggering. A subsequent study by the GAO indicated that 
one well-known measure of investor sentiment, which was inaugurated 
in 1996, was at its lowest recorded level in June and July 2002.136 
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Enron’s bankruptcy spurred initial legislative efforts,137 but these stalled. 
Subsequent revelations of accounting fraud at Adelphia, Global Crossing, and Tyco 
International,138 with the WorldCom scandal as the tipping point, gave fresh impetus 
to reform efforts.139  
Romano’s critique of SOX posits that Congress legislated in the face of empirical 
studies that failed to support important provisions of the Act.140 She singles out as 
examples of congressional “quackery” the following provisions: (1) the prohibition 
on company loans to executives, (2) the requirement that audit committees be 
independent, (3) the requirement of executive certification of financial statements, 
and (4) the ban on the provision of nonaudit services by auditors.141 
The dictation/delegation hypothesis does not take any position on the costs and 
benefits of these provisions, although in prior work I have questioned the utility of 
director “independence.”142 Dictation/delegation simply predicts that SOX, passed 
as it was in the wake of a salient crisis, will fall on the delegation end of the spectrum. 
The question raised for current purposes by the four provisions highlighted by 
Professor Romano is whether they involved Congress in dictating policy, rather than 
delegating policy-making authority in a time of crisis. At first blush, these measures 
might seem to embody specific congressional policy prescriptions, but that account 
is too simplistic. 
In fact, in SOX, Congress delegated much of the nitty-gritty implementation of 
the Act’s requirements to the SEC and to a new legislatively created entity, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). For example, with respect to 
audit-committee independence (item number two above), the SEC had 270 days to 
promulgate rules directing the exchanges to implement their own response to these 
requirements.143 Final agency rules elaborated on the meaning of “independence,”144 
and they also provided for a transition period,145 exemptions,146 and special rules for 
foreign private issuers.147 As for officer certification of financial statements (item 
number three), Congress directed the SEC to require by rule each company filing 
under the 1934 Act to certify annual or quarterly reports,148 and the resulting SEC 
rule, in contrast to the federal act, treats this subject in detail, specifying which filers 
are subject to the requirement (including foreign private issuers, banks and savings 
associations, and asset-backed securities issuers), and what “disclosure controls and 
procedures” mean.149 As for the prohibition on nonaudit services by auditors (item 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Id. at 1558.  
 138. Id. at 1545. 
 139. See Coffee, supra note 35, at 1036.  
 140. Romano, supra note 14, at 1526–27. 
 141. Id. at 1529–43. 
 142. Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 449 (2008). 
 143. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775–76. 
 144. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b)(1) (2016). 
 145. See § 240.10A-3(a)(5) (providing varying compliance deadlines for “foreign private 
issuers and smaller reporting companies” compared to “other listed issuers”). 
 146. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(iv). 
 147. § 240.10A-3(b)(1)(iv)(C)–(E). 
 148. § 302(a), 116 Stat. at 777. 
 149. Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification 
2017] DICTATION AND DELEGATION IN SECURITIES REGULATION 457 
 
number four), Congress itself enacted a laundry list of prohibited activities, but also 
delegated to the PCAOB the power to identify “any other services that the Board 
determines, by regulation, [to be] impermissible.”150 The SEC did not take up 
Congress’s invitation to create new categories of forbidden nonaudit services, but—
consistent with Congress’s delegation of rule-making authority—it did elaborate on 
many of the congressionally established categories.151  
With regard to the executive-loan prohibition (item number one), that restriction 
stemmed from a problem specific to WorldCom: using company stock as collateral, 
WorldCom’s CEO, Bernie Ebbers, had borrowed millions of dollars to fund enter-
prises ranging from a Canadian cattle ranch to a trucking company to a minor league 
hockey team.152 As WorldCom stock began to sink, his lenders pressured him to sell 
the stock, and the board authorized the corporation to loan Ebbers money to prevent 
a sell-off that would lower the stock price still further.153 Congress responded by 
prohibiting company loans to executives—and in doing so created problems for com-
pany practices as routine as advancing newly hired executives money for relocation 
expenses.154 
Thus, while Congress might have fashioned SOX in a manner unsupported by 
empirical data, it delegated many matters of implementation to the SEC. Nor is this 
assertion new or controversial. Other scholars have noted that the 2002 Congress 
“painted with a broad brush”155 and left the SEC with “extensive rulemaking 
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powers.”156 Indeed, as John Paul Lucci has detailed, Congress left the SEC with 
instructions to: 
(1) develop accounting standards under new Section 13(b) of the 
Securities Act; (2) define by rule prohibited non-auditing services; (3) 
prohibit the listing of companies on exchanges that do not comply with 
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley; (4) develop procedures for CEO 
certification of financials; (5) clarify prohibited trades during blackout 
periods; (6) promulgate rules of professional responsibility for attorneys 
appearing before the commission; (7) develop rules for the treatment of 
“off-balance sheet transactions;” (8) require pro forma financial infor-
mation to be filed with periodic reports; (9) require internal control re-
ports; (10) report whether the company has developed internal ethics 
rules; (11) require disclosure of whether an audit committee has “at least 
1 member who is a financial expert;” (12) develop rules for handling 
conflicts of interest involving security analysts; (13) define terms in cer-
tain circumstances; and (14) require document retention.157 
Thus, while SOX may have breathed life into corporate governance proposals that 
lacked empirical support, it delegated much of the implementation to the SEC. 
3. The Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
The financial crisis of 2008 began with rumblings in 2007 about the failure of two 
Bear Stearns hedge funds158 and the bankruptcy of subprime mortgage lender New 
Century.159 In 2008 a series of high-stakes events made clear that these failures were 
not isolated phenomena. JP Morgan Chase bought Bear Stearns with federal assis-
tance,160 and the federal government took over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.161 
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.162 AIG received federal assistance.163 
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Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the last two independent banks, converted to 
bank holding companies so that they could receive greater federal assistance.164 
Washington Mutual collapsed,165 the stock market lost fifty-four percent of its value 
in less than eighteen months,166 and the nation entered the “Great Recession.”167  
On July 10, 2010, Congress responded by passing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.168 The stated purpose of Dodd-Frank was 
“[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability 
and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the 
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial 
services practices, and for other purposes.”169 Each of Dodd-Frank’s goals was ambi-
tious. Together they represented a sweeping and tremendously complicated 
undertaking. The dictation/delegation theory predicts a high amount of delegation 
after any crisis. Given the crippling economic crisis of 2008 and the scope of the 
2010 reforms, it is unsurprising that Dodd-Frank in fact contained a large number of 
delegations. Indeed, it called for 398 rule makings from fifteen different agencies.170 
Congress delegated more to the agencies than they could reasonably handle. In 
April of 2011, nine months after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, only 5.4% of the rules 
had been finalized, and all twenty-six of the rule-making deadlines for that month 
were missed.171 By July of 2011, regulators had only completed thirty-three, or 20%, 
of the 163 required rule makings mandated by Congress in that time frame.172 In July 
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alone, 104 deadlines were missed, and only thirteen rule-making requirements were 
finalized.173 Only 25.5% of the deadlines were met by the end of 2011.174 And by 
July 2012, the two-year anniversary of Dodd-Frank, 140 (63%) of the 221 rule-
making deadlines had been missed, while eighty-one deadlines had been met.175 
(Additionally, only 119 of the 398 required rule makings were finalized, and 142 
rule-making requirements had yet to be proposed.)176 By the end of the fourth quarter 
of 2014, four and a half years after the passage of Dodd-Frank, 231 of the 398 total 
required rule makings had been finalized, “while 94 (23.62%) rulemaking require-
ments [had] not yet been proposed.”177  
One example of these delays is the Volcker Rule, which deals with a ban on 
banks’ proprietary trading. Regulators presented a proposed form of the Volcker 
Rule on October 12, 2011,178 and then gave the public until February 13, 2012, to 
comment on the proposed draft of the regulations.179 Ultimately they received over 
17,000 comments.180 This torrent of public input led to more analysis and discussion 
by the agencies, and the final rule was not released until December 10, 2013,181 over 
a year after the July 21, 2012, due date.182 However, much of this rule is still not in 
effect. On December 18, 2014, “the Federal Reserve extended the Volcker Rule’s 
conformance period for ‘legacy covered funds’ [a defined term] until July 21, 2016 
and indicated it would likely extend [that] period” for yet another year.183 The Federal 
Reserve also allowed delay until 2017 for collateralized loan obligations and the 
provision of the Volcker Rule that bans banks from placing their own money in risky 
hedge and private equity funds.184 
The dictation/delegation thesis suggests that in times of crisis Congress will 
delegate more policy work to administrative agencies. Part IV will test this hypothe-
sis, but first we turn to the other side of the legislative coin—noncrisis legislation.  
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B. Noncrisis Legislation 
Congress does sometimes act in the securities arena in the absence of crisis. 
Indeed, no salient crises spurred five modern instances of congressional action. And 
notably, in four of these five instances, the impetus for legislation came largely from 
Silicon Valley. 
1.  The Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980 (SBIIA) 
The economy of the 1970s was not prosperous: the decade in fact saw a business 
downturn, double-digit inflation, and a recession. But there was no crisis that 
prompted the enactment of the SBIIA; the pressures for enactment came from an-
other source.  
Beginning in the early 1970s, private equity firms made the claim that the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, which, among other things, required that a fund 
have no more than 100 beneficial owners,185 limited their ability to raise capital.186 
In particular, one venture capital fund, Heizer Corporation, lobbied Congress to ad-
dress this problem by allowing formation of business development corporations 
(BDCs).187 Congress responded in 1980 by passing SBIIA and thus creating BDCs, 
“publicly traded closed-end funds that make investments in private [or thinly traded] 
public companies” in the form of long-term debt or equity capital, with the goal of 
generating capital appreciation.188 Significantly, Congress made all but one of the 
1980 Amendments effective immediately.189 
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. Doug Cornelius, Qualified Purchasers Under the Investment Company Act, 
COMPLIANCE BUILDING (Apr. 21, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.compliancebuilding.com/2010 
/04/21/qualified-purchasers-under-the-investment-company-act [https://perma.cc/XP8Q-QHG9]. 
 186. See Doran Howitt, Business Development Companies: Boom or Bust, INC. (May 1, 
1982), http://www.inc.com/magazine/19820501/7594.html [https://perma.cc/Q3NQ-U88P] 
(noting that before the law passed in 1980, “[v]enture capitalists had lobbied long and hard for 
the law, claiming that it would improve the ability of innovative small businesses to raise 
capital for growth”). 
 187. See Small Business Investment Incentive Act: Hearing on H.R. 3991 Before the 
Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 
96th Cong. 243–50 (1979) [hereinafter SBIIA Hearing] (statement of E.F. Heizer, Chairman 
and President, Heizer Corporation, asking Congress to pass SBIIA). 
 188. Kevin Mahn, The ABCs of Business Development Companies, FORBES (Dec. 1 2014, 
10:18 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor/2014/12/01/the-abcs-of-business-development 
-companies [https://web.archive.org/web/20161027112141/http://www.forbes.com/sites/advisor 
/2014/12/01/the-abcs-of-business-development-companies/#3301d1584d59]. 
 189. Only Title V of SBIIA explicitly set an effective date. Small Business Investment 
Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, § 507, 94 Stat. 2275, 2294 (1980). Interestingly, 
Title I of SBIIA, which concerns the BDCs, has the most delegations (eleven, all permissive) 
of any title of the Act. Id. at §§ 101–05, 94 Stat. at 2275–89. Upon further analysis, however, 
these delegations are of relatively minor points. Id. The Act articulates two specific ways a 
firm can qualify as a BDC and then grants the power to the SEC to, by rule, articulate further 
paths to BDC status. The other permissive delegations leave it to the SEC to hash out details 
of minimal importance. For example, Congress specifies that beneficial ownership in the case 
of legal separation, divorce, or death remains with the transferor, “pursuant to such rules and 
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Part IV will consider the SBIIA in detail, but a key point is worth noting here: in 
the midst of debate on the Hill, the dictation/delegation thesis played out in a 
remarkably explicit way. The SEC resisted industry efforts to secure new legislation, 
with Commissioner Philip Loomis arguing that “our position is that the bill in its 
present form is not needed because the goals can be accomplished—indeed, may 
already have been largely accomplished administratively—without further legisla-
tion.”190 Arthur Little, President of the National Association of Small Business 
Investment Companies (NASBIC) and CEO of Narragansett Capital Corporation, 
vehemently disagreed: 
 [NASBIC] and others appearing before you today feel that the time 
for Congress to act on our Investment Company Act problem is long 
overdue. We have repeatedly come to Congress for legislative relief and 
been shunted back to the SEC for administrative relief which has been 
promised but never forthcoming, on at least those four occasions that I 
mentioned.191 
He urged Congress to act “once and for all” and to no longer listen to “the repeated 
assurances of the [SEC].”192 
It is unclear whether the SBIIA succeeded in its goals; indeed, some deemed it a 
failure.193 Only seven companies had elected to be regulated as business development 
companies by August 1981, and by 1982 only two such companies had gone pub-
lic.194 One of those two companies was the selfsame Heizer Corporation that had 
lobbied on behalf of the amendments.195 One commentator has gone so far as to 
describe the SBIIA as “the Heizer amendments to the Investment Company Act.”196 
                                                                                                                 
 
regulations as the Commission shall prescribe as necessary or appropriate.” Id. § 102. Simi-
larly, in Section 103 it specifies that companies that propose to make an initial public offering 
must notify the commission that they intend in good faith to file an election to become BDCs. 
Id. § 103. Congress delegated to the SEC the power to “by rule” prescribe the form and manner 
of the notification, but made clear that the company has the right to make the public offering. 
Id. Six of the remaining eight delegations also grant the SEC power to enlarge BDCs’ rights. 
The remaining two delegate to the SEC the power to prescribe rules for limiting BDC insiders 
or affiliates from inside transactions.  
 190. SBIIA Hearing, supra note 187, at 35 (statement of Phillip A. Loomis, Comm’r, 
Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 191. Id. at 132 (statement of Arthur D. Little, President-Elect, National Association of 
Small Business Investment Companies). 
 192. Id. at 131. 
 193. See Duke K. Bristow & Lee R. Petillon, Public Venture Capital Funds: New Relief 
from the Investment Company Act of 1940, 18 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 393, 399 (1999). 
 194. Reginald L. Thomas & Paul F. Roye, Regulation of Business Development Companies 
Under the Investment Company Act, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 895, 935 (1982). 
 195. Howitt, supra note 186. 
 196. Joseph W. Bartlett, Another New Paradigm: Multiplex Capital Fund—A Quick and 
Expensive Way To Get into Action, VC EXPERTS (May 2013), https://vcexperts.com 
/buzz_articles/1360 [https://perma.cc/A9GD-DFJX]. 
Heizer was apparently playing both the dictation and delegation game simultaneously. SEC 
Associate Director of Investments Lybecker:  
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The episode illustrates that sometimes not just an industry, but one or two particular 
firms, can find success in Congress—including success in the form of preempting 
agency control of a regulatory field. 
2. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) & Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) 
In 1994 House Speaker Newt Gingrich built a national political campaign around 
a so-called contract with America.197 That campaign was successful and Republican 
majorities took control of the House and Senate in 1995.198 One major focus of 
Republican lawmakers involved securities class actions. Reform efforts grew out of 
two main concerns. First, critics argued that securities class actions were simply too 
easy to file and triggered a lengthy and costly discovery process.199 Pre-PSLRA 
abuses included plaintiffs’ attorneys reportedly filing cut-and-paste complaints the 
day after the price of a security dropped.200  
The second criticism was that these strike suits disproportionately harmed 
emerging high-technology companies,201 “because they were risky enterprises sub-
ject to fluctuations in sales and revenues and, therefore, volatile stock prices.”202 
Faced with the costs of extensive discovery, these companies often settled meritless 
suits to avoid a protracted and costly defense.203 Silicon Valley companies thus 
                                                                                                                 
 
However, and I hope this is not speaking out of turn, we have been dealing with 
one of the people scheduled to testify later in your hearings, Mr. Heizer and his 
attorneys, in processing a draft application they intend to file for exemptive relief 
under the Investment Company Act, and we have worked out an approach to the 
upstream affiliate problem under section 17 that goes well beyond what we have 
done for all registered companies to take care of those problems inherent in 
venture capital companies. 
SBIIA Hearing, supra note 187, at 74 (statement of Martin E. Lybecker, Associate Director, 
Division of Investment Management, Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 197. Katherine Q. Seelye, The 1994 Campaign: The Republicans; with Fiery Words, 
Gingrich Builds His Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 27, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10 
/27/us/the-1994-campaign-the-republicans-with-fiery-words-gingrich-builds-his-kingdom.html 
[https://perma.cc/A3E2-PBSA].  
 198. See Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 
718 (1996) (“After the Republican party gained control of both houses of Congress in the 1994 
elections, the movement for private securities litigation reform took on a new urgency. On 
January 4, 1995, H.R. 10, the ‘Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995,’ was introduced 
in the House, with five sponsors and 115 cosponsors. The original bill, drafted by California 
Congressman Christopher Cox, had its origins in one of the ten planks of the Republican 
party’s 1994 election campaign Contract with America.” (footnote omitted)). 
 199. See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the 
Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 537, 553 (1998) (“This ease in filing, they claimed, was resulting in strike suits.”). 
 200. H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
730, 730. 
 201. See Sale, supra note 199, at 555 (“[T]hose pressing for reform argued that start-up 
companies, primarily emerging high-technology companies, were hardest hit by strike suits.”). 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id.  
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combined forces with accounting firms and venture capital firms in an effort to secure 
new rules,204 producing “one of the most successful lobbying campaigns in the 
history of the Republic.”205 The PSLRA legislation imposed heightened pleading 
standards (including as to the defendant’s state of mind) and putting off discovery 
until resolution of any motion to dismiss.206 
Following the PSLRA’s passage, both its proponents and opponents expected that 
it would cause a decrease in the number of securities class actions.207 Yet the number 
of federal securities class-action lawsuits, while dipping in the year following 
PSLRA’s passage, did not significantly decrease; indeed, the number of securities 
fraud complaints filed against companies reached its high point in 1998.208 One 
explanation was that plaintiffs with less meritorious claims reacted to the PSLRA by 
funneling claims into state court. The empirics supporting this claim were mixed,209 
but advocates of SLUSA, which federally preempted state law securities claims, ar-
gued that PSLRA created “an explosion of cases being brought in state courts.”210  
One analysis ascribes the impetus behind SLUSA to an ongoing fight between 
Silicon Valley and the plaintiff’s bar—and one particular attorney, William S. 
Lerach.211 Lerach, an infamous plaintiffs’ attorney who was later sentenced to two 
years in prison for charges involving paying “professional plaintiffs,”212 was de-
scribed as “the most feared of the class-action lawyers for plaintiffs.”213 After the 
1995 passage of the PSLRA, he championed California Proposition 211, which 
“would have made it easier for investors . . . to file securities-fraud [suits] against 
                                                                                                                 
 
 204. See Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) 
More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 51–52 (1998) (“The PSLRA . . . was a direct 
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 205. Benjamin J. Stein, Next Stop the Statehouse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, at F11, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/31/business/viewpoint-next-stop-the-statehouse.html [https:// 
perma.cc/U356-HPQQ].  
 206. Sale, supra note 199, at 557–58 (outlining the law’s heightened requirements of 
plaintiffs).  
 207. Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to State Court: The Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L. J. 141, 152 (1999). 
 208. Id. at 154. 
 209. (and suffered from unreliable data). See id. at 166–70. 
 210. Id. at 173. 
 211. Leslie Eaton, The Silicon Valley Gang; An Influential Industry with Lots of Money Is 
Getting Its Way on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998 
/06/11/business/silicon-valley-gang-influential-industry-with-lots-money-getting-its-way-capitol 
.html [https://perma.cc/QS5J-68YF]. 
 212. Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J. CORP. L. 153, 175–76 (2008). 
 213. Eaton, supra note 211. 
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[California] companies.”214 In response, Silicon Valley companies and venture 
capitalists organized a $40 million campaign and successfully defeated the meas-
ure.215 Silicon Valley then turned to Congress to “make sure” it would never face “a 
similar threat, in California or anywhere else.”216 A New York Times investigation 
suggested that millions of dollars in Silicon Valley campaign contributions 
—“includ[ing] $150,000 to members of the Senate Banking Committee, which 
handled the litigation legislation but otherwise has little involvement in technology 
issues”—persuaded lawmakers to support SLUSA.217 The article also implies that 
the power of Silicon Valley explains why Arthur Levitt Jr., “the politically astute 
chairman of the S.E.C., . . . reversed himself and agreed to support the litigation bill 
on the day his renomination was taken up by the Senate Banking Committee.”218 
Whatever the reason for its passage, SLUSA successfully preempted state securities 
claims, funneling them instead to federal court and the more stringent rules PSLRA 
had earlier imposed. Both the PSLRA and SLUSA delegated very little to the SEC. 
3. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) 
NSMIA sheds light on another dynamic in the political economy of securities 
regulation: namely, the role of the states. In NSMIA, the mutual fund industry, small 
issuers, and the SEC joined together in supporting federal preemption of the 
patchwork of state rules that imposed reporting and other requirements on mutual 
fund operators. State regulation was problematic because each state imposed differ-
ing requirements on funds. And these problems were particularly acute because some 
states imposed merit-based regulation of fund offerings, departing sharply from the 
disclosure-centered model of federal regulation.219 
There was an uneasy alliance between the SEC and industry members that backed 
federal preemption of state regulation. While one initial impetus for NSMIA came 
from a 1992 SEC study,220 the other driver was a newly Republican Congress, which 
had recently enacted the PSLRA and was eager to continue to deregulate securities 
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 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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 218. Id. 
 219. See Paul S. Stevens & Craig S. Tyle, Mutual Funds, Investment Advisers, and the 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act, 52 BUS. LAW. 419, 428–29 (1997) (“Because 
such state laws were adopted to protect investors from making imprudent investments, they 
generally were designed to regulate the merits of securities offerings. The Securities Act, on 
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 220. Id. at 427–28 (“Although the NSMIA by no means included all of the staff's 
recommendations in the 1992 Study, the study did provide the first impetus for the amend-
ments adopted in 1996, including the liberalization of mutual fund advertising and a new 
exception from the Investment Company Act for investment companies whose securities are 
owned exclusively by ‘qualified purchasers.’”). 
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law.221 In 1995, Representative Jack Fields (R-TX) introduced the “Capital Markets 
Deregulation and Liberalization Act,” or the “Fields Bill.”222 A popular press article 
asserted that Republicans were “gunning” for the SEC with this bill, which reduced 
the number of SEC Commissioners from five to three223 and cut its budget by twenty 
percent.224 Some observers speculated that Fields had gone too far, alarming the very 
Wall Street backers he had sought to court. In any event, the final version of the 
NSMIA bill eliminated these cutbacks aimed at the SEC. That bill also introduced a 
new requirement that the SEC consider the promotion of efficiency and capital for-
mation, as well as investor protection, when engaging in rule making.225 
No matter how strained the SEC-Republican alliance might have been, they faced 
a common adversary: the fifty states, which were intent on defending their regulatory 
turf. Leading the state-protecting charge was the powerful North American Securities 
Administrators Association (NASAA), the organization of state securities-law 
administrators.226 But the efforts of the NASAA were largely unavailing. In particu-
lar, the NSMIA as enacted provided for almost total federal preemption of state 
mutual-fund regulation.  
In an instance of clear dictation, Title I of NSMIA provides that “covered 
securities” are exempt from state regulation of securities offerings, and if a security 
is “issued by an investment company that is registered, or that has filed a registration 
statement, under the Investment Company Act of 1940,” then it is a covered secu-
rity.227 Lest there be any doubt, this provision’s heading is “exclusive federal 
registration of investment companies.” The federal preemption, “[p]robably the most 
significant provision” of NSMIA, took effect immediately upon signing.228  
To be sure, the NASAA had some success: it successfully lobbied to continue to 
receive notice filings and to maintain the capacity to receive fees from fund 
offerings.229 But “the primary effect is to prohibit states from performing the 
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110 Stat. 3416, 3418. 
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‘gatekeeper’ function they previously exercised over investment company 
registration statements.”230 
NSMIA also imposed federal requirements on broker-dealers and financial 
advisors. As the final law attests, interest groups differed in their success in achieving 
their goals of preemption in the face of state opposition. Small issuers did not fare as 
well as did the mutual funds. Professor Rutheford B. Campbell applies public choice 
theory to conclude that the mutual fund industry and the state securities regulators, 
as cohesive interest groups, were able to protect their interests in NSMIA in a way 
that small issuers were not. Professor Campbell observes that “the millions of small 
issuers, who in total seemingly had more to gain or lose than either the mutual fund 
industry or the individual state administrators,” lacked the political clout of mutual 
funds or the NASAA, and “received essentially nothing from the legislation.”231 
Thus—in stark contrast to mutual fund operators—they remained subject to a 
patchwork of state regulations, without the benefit of federal preemption.  
Professor Jennifer Johnson has argued that this reform was misguided. Another 
provision in NSMIA provided for total federal preemption of private placements. As 
she explains, most witnesses in the congressional hearings testified that the states 
should retain a role in private-placement disclosure regulation.232 The overarching 
goal of NSMIA was to eliminate duplicative dual federal and state registration, but 
small private placements—those that were not national in scope—did not qualify 
because the federal government effectively exerted no regulatory authority over 
them. This preemption provision thus created a “regulatory black hole.”233 In 
explaining this outcome, Professor Johnson points out that representatives from the 
securities industry “dominated” the list of witnesses at the NSMIA hearings.234 And 
these industries did more than just testify. Johnson reports on over $220,000 in 
contributions from industry PACs to Representative Fields in the two years prior to 
his introduction of the Fields Bill.235 
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Similarly, House Commerce Committee Chairman, Representative Thomas 
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that from 1994-1996, PACs associated with the finance and insurance and real 
estate sector contributed $400,000 to Representative Fields (nearly 4x the 
contributions he received in the previous election cycle) and $100,816 to 
Representative Bliley. During this same time period, these PACs contributed 
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How does NSMIA square with the dictation/delegation thesis? Mutual fund 
operators achieved their first-best goal by securing federal preemption for their 
industry. To be sure, with that federal preemption came attendant agency delegation. 
But in context that outcome was not surprising, even though it involved a noncrisis 
related delegation of governance power. For one, an SEC study prompted the act, 
and it is to be expected that ensuing legislation would enhance SEC discretion. More-
over, the mutual fund industry backed the legislation, even with its delegation of 
power, because that delegation was far preferable to the status quo ante. In exchange 
for an exemption from regulation by fifty separate state securities regulation regimes, 
a modest empowerment of the SEC was a small price to pay. 
4. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act) 
 The JOBS Act represents the most fundamental reform of securities regulation 
since 1975—arguably since 1934. I classify it as noncrisis regulation even though, 
to be sure, the pre-JOBS Act economy was in bad shape. But the 2008 financial crisis, 
three years in the past, was no longer salient. Certainly no immediate scandal 
prompted the JOBS Act. To the extent that the economy was suffering in 2011, there 
was no clear reason why legislators should look to securities regulation—as opposed 
to financial stimulus or tax policy—as the logical response. For these reasons, the 
JOBS Act is best viewed as noncrisis regulation. And because it is relatively recent 
and its story has not been told elsewhere, this section delves deeply into the legisla-
tion’s origins. 
In 2010 the nation remained in the grip of the recession catalyzed by the financial 
crisis of 2008. Unemployment was high.236 The American public voiced its dis-
content with President Obama and the Democrats in power in the 2010 mid-term 
elections. In that “historic” wave, Republicans gained 63 House seats, the largest 
gain in one party’s power since the 1940s.237 In response, the Republican House 
Speaker John Boehner claimed a “mandate” to shrink the federal government’s 
reach.238  
In his State of the Union address on January 25, 2011, President Obama signaled 
a new willingness to deregulate. “To reduce barriers to growth and investment,” he 
declared, “I’ve ordered a review of Government regulations. When we find rules that 
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put an unnecessary burden on businesses, we will fix them.”239 He termed this new 
program “Startup America.”240 
Part V.B. will delve into the interests that backed specific titles of the JOBS Act, 
but the catalyst for its passage was Title I, the so-called “IPO on-ramp.” Title I was 
the brainchild of Kate Mitchell, a venture capitalist with Scale Venture Partners and 
outgoing chairman of the National Venture Capital Association, who was instrumen-
tal in the passage of the entire JOBS Act.241  
In March of 2011 Mitchell participated in a conference at the Treasury 
Department called, “Access to Capital: Fostering Growth and Innovation for Small 
Companies.”242 “During a break [in the meeting], Mitchell ducked into an empty 
room with Greg Becker, CEO of Silicon Valley Bank; Steven Bochner, partner at 
Palo Alto law firm Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati; [and] Carter Mack, president 
of San Francisco investment bank JMP Group.”243 They created an ad hoc group 
called the IPO Task Force, made up of “entrepreneurs, bankers, accountants, 
academics, and investors” to discuss changes in the IPO process.244 They also invited 
lobbyists for NYSE Euronext and the National Venture Capital Association to offer 
advice.245  
As the IPO Task Force went about its work in the summer of 2011, the United 
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founder, Cascade Communications & Sycamore Networks). Two were securities lawyers: Joel 
Trotter (Latham & Watkins) and Steve Bochner (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati). Three 
were academics or accountants: Bill Sahlman (Harvard Business School), Carol Stacey (S.E.C. 
Institute), and Chuck Roberl (retired head of PWC Tech Practice). Four were investment 
bankers: Paul Deninger (Evercore), Carter Mack (JMP Securities), and Brent Gledhill & Brett 
Paschke (William Blair). IPO Task Force, Rebuilding the IPO On-Ramp 3 (Oct. 20, 2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/ipotaskforceslides.pdf [https://perma.cc/42Q7-SA97] 
(slideshow accompanying IPO Task Force report). 
 245. Id. 
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States was in the midst of a crisis regarding the debt ceiling.246 The government 
approached statutory limits on the amount it could borrow, and some Republicans 
advocated refusal to put in place a new and elevated debt ceiling.247 On July 31, two 
days before the preexisting ceiling was to be reached, Congress struck a 
compromise.248 Even so, just five days later, on August 5, 2011, Standard & Poors 
downgraded the credit rating of the United States from AAA to AA+.249  
The following month, on August 8, 2011, President Obama signaled a willingness 
to engage with Republicans on the economy:  
These aren’t Democratic proposals. These aren’t big government pro-
posals. These are all ideas that traditionally Republicans have agreed 
to . . . countless times in the past. . . . 
. . . . 
Markets will rise and fall, but this is the United States of America. No 
matter what some agency may say, we’ve always been and always will 
be a AAA country. For all of the challenges we face, we continue to have 
the best universities, some of the most productive workers, the most 
innovative companies, the most adventurous entrepreneurs on Earth.250  
As these events unfolded, new Republican-backed bills were introduced, focusing 
on everything from raising the threshold for private companies to go public to easing 
restrictions on capital raising.251  
On October 20, 2011, the IPO Task Force issued a report titled “Rebuilding the 
IPO On-Ramp: Putting Emerging Companies and the Job Market Back on the Road 
to Growth.”252 When Silicon Valley companies began pushing for Title I, many 
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 251. See generally Susan Jones, Republicans Remind Obama: Democrats Are Blocking 
House-Passed Jobs Bills, CNS NEWS (Sept. 7, 2011, 6:10 AM), http://cnsnews.com/news 
/article/republicans-remind-obama-democrats-are-blocking-house-passed-jobs-bills [https:// 
perma.cc/H8TF-TVML] (describing unpassed bills, including the Consumer Financial 
Protection & Soundness Improvement Act, the Reducing Regulatory Burdens Act, and the 
Clean Water Cooperative Federalism Act, among others that would have reduced regulations 
relating to capital raising, etc.).  
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Republican candidates saw it as an opportunity to convince these companies and their 
employees to begin contributing to Republican campaigns. 253 Steve Case, of 
Revolution LLC, joined President Obama’s new Council on Jobs and 
Competitiveness and also agreed to serve as chairman of the Startup America 
Partnership.254 Case also made sure to keep contact with Republicans, advising Eric 
Cantor, the House Majority Leader, on proposals aimed at reducing rules and taxes 
on technology and start-up firms.255  
The JOBS Act ultimately adopted two of the IPO Task Force’s three 
recommendations nearly whole cloth: first, providing an “on-ramp” for emerging 
growth companies with annual gross revenues of less than $1 billion, and second, 
loosening restrictions on the ability of companies pre-IPO to communicate to 
investors.256 
In October 2011, Case met with Cantor.257 Cantor began encouraging House 
Republicans to strengthen their ties to technology firms.258 During this time he also 
contacted “capital and private equity funds in Silicon Valley, Boston, the research 
triangle in North Carolina[,] and . . . Virginia. . . . ask[ing] for ideas and support.”259 
Cantor, Representative Kevin McCarthy of California, and Representative Paul Ryan 
of Wisconsin worked together to make Silicon Valley connections.260 Some of the 
notable companies they met with included Facebook, Google Inc., Apple Inc.,  and 
Microsoft Corp.261 This push resulted in donations to Republican war chests totaling 
$248,000 just from northern California.262 
Stephen Fincher introduced H.R. 3606—the first bill to contain Title I’s On-Ramp 
provisions—on December 8, 2011.263 President Obama signaled his support of pro-
startup legislation in his January 24, 2012, State of the Union address: 
After all, innovation is what America has always been about. Most 
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new jobs are created in startups and small businesses. So let’s pass an 
agenda that helps them succeed. Tear down regulations that prevent 
aspiring entrepreneurs from getting the financing to grow. Expand tax 
relief to small businesses that are raising wages and creating good jobs. 
Both parties agree on these ideas. So put them in a bill, and get it on my 
desk this year.264 
By March 8, 2012, the proposed JOBS Act had swelled to encompass industry-
advantaging provisions from five other bills.265  
Resistance to the JOBS Act came late. On March 16, 2012, SEC Commissioner 
Luis Aguilar urged that investor protection would suffer.266 Mary Schapiro, the SEC 
chairman, sent a six-page letter criticizing the bill to Congress on March 13, 2012.267 
Senators Jack Reed (D-RI) and Carl Levin (D-MI) attempted to introduce investor-
protective modifications in the Senate268 on March 20, 2012, only to meet with stiff 
Silicon Valley resistance. Stymied on that front, Senator Jack Reed pushed to change 
the method for counting holders from record to beneficial holders—a move that ulti-
mately failed269 but succeeded in alarming Wall Street banks, who joined ranks in 
opposing the Reed amendment.270 Joining the cause was a high-tech effort led by 
AngelList founder Naval Ravikant, who in thirty-six hours created a Twitter petition 
with 5000 signatures that could be sorted “by location and how influential, where 
they were, and what they’d invested in, and what they look like, and who their senator 
was”—and who was a major campaign donor.271 
Ultimately the Senate passed the bill by a vote of 73–26 (including 26 “nay” votes 
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from Democrats) on March 22, 2012,272 and the House approved it 380–41,273 with 
145 Democrats voting in its favor.274 The one significant victory reform-minded 
Democrats gained was an increase of SEC oversight of crowdfunding—Title III.275 
In the end, the JOBS Act’s passage was claimed a resounding success—a rare in-
stance of bipartisan legislation in the midst of a gridlocked Washington.276  
IV. DICTATION, DELEGATION, AND THE DATA 
Having surveyed the key pieces of securities legislation enacted by Congress from 
1970 to 2014, we can turn to the extent to which it introduced into each statute 
delegations of authority to agency decision making. To that end, I have constructed 
a dataset that covers every title of each securities law enacted by Congress during 
this time period. These data include nine statutes that include sixty-six total titles. 
Although the number of acts is limited, they comprise the entire field of securities 
enacted during this forty-four-year period.  
A. Methodology 
My goal is to systematically categorize instances of delegation in securities law. 
Notably, political scientists David Epstein and Sharyn O’Hallaran undertake a simi-
lar project by coding 257 statutes in a variety of fields.277 Epstein and O’Hallaran’s 
methodology falls short for securities-law purposes in three regards. First, their cod-
ing scheme relies on the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, which lists “the key 
provisions of major legislation enacted during each year.”278 The result of this ap-
proach, however, is to omit altogether key pieces of securities legislation—including 
the JOBS Act and SBIIA—presumably because they do not qualify as “major 
legislation.” 
Second, Epstein and O’Halloran borrow from two earlier categorization systems. 
The first, Mayhew’s classification of enacted laws, does not contain securities 
regulation.279 The other, Poole and Rosenthal’s roll-call vote study, aggregates 
banking and finance in one category.280 Congress, however, delegates not by policy 
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area but by act, and the dictation/delegation hypothesis suggests that its delegation 
waxes and wanes over time.  
Finally, Congress can delegate in different ways. Sometimes it affirmatively 
orders an agency to engage in rule making—what I term a mandatory delegation. 
Sometimes Congress permits but does not order agency rule making. Sometimes it 
preserves a space for agency discretion outside of rule making. Epstein and 
O’Halloran’s coding elides the distinction between mandatory and permissive rule 
making and skips over instances in which an agency may exercise discretion even 
while not engaging in rule making.281  
In sum, while Epstein and O’Halloran’s study offers valuable insights, it does not 
fit my purpose of testing the dictation/delegation hypothesis in the securities field. 
As a result, I put to use, but expand upon, the coding scheme of Curtis W. Copeland’s 
report on rule-making requirements and authorities in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.282 Like Copeland, I categorize statutes as call-
ing for mandatory rule making if they state that an agency—usually the SEC—
“shall” promulgate rules, or when the statute’s wording otherwise suggests that the 
agency must regulate.283 Often, but not always, Congress imposes deadlines—for 
example, within 180 days, 90 days, or 270 days after the bill’s effective date—when 
it mandates rule making.284 
Next in the delegation spectrum is the category of permissive rule making, where 
Congress identifies areas in which the agency may create rules but is not ordered to 
do so. According to these statutes, the agency “may, by rule” or “may, by regulation” 
promulgate the substantive rule.285 In these areas Congress does not expressly direct 
delegation, but permits it.  
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I do not attempt to code for dictations that Congress makes in its statutes, in large 
part because of the inherent judgment calls that such coding would necessitate. For 
example, consider the possible number of dictations when Congress states that 
SLUSA covers class actions that involve 
(i) the purchase or sale of securities by the issuer or an affiliate of the 
issuer exclusively from or to holders of equity securities of the issuer; or 
(ii) any recommendation, position, or other communication with respect 
to the sale of securities of the issuer that—(I) is made by or on behalf of 
the issuer or an affiliate of the issuer to holders of equity securities of the 
issuer; and (II) concerns decisions of those equity holders with respect to 
voting their securities, acting in response to a tender or exchange offer, 
or exercising dissenters’ or appraisal rights.286 
This subsection can be seen as containing one, two, three, five, or more dictations, 
depending on the level of generality one chooses to employ. In any event, the critical 
questions considered here involve how often and when Congress chooses to delegate 
its authority. And identifying the number of instances of delegation in each relevant 
statute is a relatively objective task. Consequently, my data set itemizes delegations 
of congressional authority without attempting to enumerate dictations.  
Certain delegations—what I term “ministerial,” “catchall,” and “timing” delega-
tions—are excluded from my coding of congressional acts. Ministerial delegations 
occur when Congress simply orders the SEC to make rules to carry out a clear legisla-
tive mandate. One example is provided by JOBS Act section 303 in which Congress 
excluded crowdfunding investors from the total number of shareholders of record for 
the purposes of section 12(g) of the Exchange Act’s threshold and then ordered the 
SEC to “issue a rule to carry out” the amendment within 270 days.287 Catchall 
delegations occur when Congress sets a deadline for implementing whatever rules 
the legislation requires without specifying any particular content. For example, after 
delegating a variety of questions to the SEC, section 302 of the JOBS Act tasks the 
agency with “issu[ing] such rules as the Commission determines may be necessary 
or appropriate for the protection of investors to carry out sections 4(6) and section 
4A of the Securities Act of 1933, as added by this title.”288 Timing delegations merely 
set forth a deadline for when rule making must occur.289  
As well as coding delegations, I also code general grants of discretion to the SEC. 
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For example, Title I of the JOBS Act provides that any new auditing rules adopted 
by PCAOB will not apply to emerging growth companies “unless the Commission 
determines that the application of such additional requirements is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, after considering the protection of investors and 
whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.”290 
Here Congress does not use formal “shall, by rule,” or “may, by rule,” language, but 
as a functional matter it vests the agency with broad power. A more complicated 
coding problem is presented by Dodd-Frank section 912. That provision states that 
“[f]or the purpose of evaluating any rule or program . . . the Commission may (1) 
gather information from and communicate with investors or other members of the 
public; (2) engage in such temporary investor testing programs as the Commission 
determines are in the public interest or would protect investors; and (3) consult with 
academics and consultants, as necessary to carry out this subsection.”291 While such 
a provision is not a mandatory or permissive rule making, it gives the agency 
“testing” authority and a broad discretion as to its use. As a practical matter, the 
agency thus can impose significant duties on regulated businesses, and I have 
therefore coded this measure as involving congressional delegation.  
My dataset also excludes provisions with no impact on the SEC’s rule making. 
For example, titles granting financing to the SEC itself occur several times.292 Other 
titles express a policy preference but contain no actual law. For example, Sarbanes-
Oxley Title X consists of a single sentence: “It is the sense of the Senate that the 
Federal income tax return of a corporation should be signed by the chief executive 
officer of such corporation.”293 I attach no delegatory significance to this title, and 
exclude it from the sample. 
The dictation/delegation hypothesis predicts that postcrisis legislative acts 
—namely, SIPA, the Amendments of 1975, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Dodd-Frank—will 
contain more delegation than their noncrisis legislative counterparts. In general, the 
data bear out the hypothesis, as shown by Figure 1, a summary of averages of post-
crisis and noncrisis delegations. First, taking mandatory and permissive delegations, 
the average number for postcrisis delegations per act (48.25) is more than twice the 
number of noncrisis delegations (17.20). Adding in instances where Congress cedes 
areas of discretion to the agency magnifies this relationship: the average number of 
postcrisis delegations and instances of discretion, at 96, is more than four times that 
in noncrisis times, at 22. Thus it does seem that, on average, when Congress acts in 
the realm of securities law in the context of crisis, it tends to delegate more often to 
the SEC. However, the question whether crisis alone explains the extent of delegation 
requires further analysis because of the role that politics plays in legislation. 
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When the same party controls the elected branches of government (Executive, 
House, and Senate), policy making becomes easier to the extent that the separate 
branches share similar goals and have incentives to work together to enact a shared 
agenda. Within this context, we might expect to see more delegations as Congress 
trusts the Executive to implement its agenda faithfully. In contrast, when opposite 
parties control Congress and the Executive, we might expect fewer delegations as 
Congress attempts to curb presidential authority over the agencies. In addition, when 
opposite parties control the House and Senate, we might actually observe more 
delegations as a means of striking a compromise between the two chambers. That is, 
because they might not agree on a specific set of rules, the two chambers might 
compromise by delegating greater authority to the regulatory agencies instead.  
B. The Political Variable 
A political explanation of congressional delegation in securities law focuses on 
the extent to which government is divided, or the extent to which a given party is in 
control of the three branches of government. To evaluate whether political factors 
overwhelm the effects of securities crises, I conducted a statistical analysis that 
weighs the two effects against one another. More specifically, I estimate a simple 
“count” model to evaluate the extent to which, first, securities crises and, second, 
partisan political alignments among the federal branches affect how Congress makes 
delegations to the SEC.294  
For each statistical model, I estimate the predicted number of delegations for each 
title as a function of both “crisis” factors and “political” factors. More specifically, I 
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code whether each act was passed in response to a securities “crisis” (“1” if yes, “0” 
if no). If the dictation/delegation theory is correct, we would expect to see more 
congressional delegations amidst securities crises and fewer such delegations in the 
absence of such crises. Nevertheless, policy making does not occur in a vacuum. 
Hence, we might suspect that political factors also affect Congress’s choice to dele-
gate to the agencies.  
To control for these political factors, I include two dichotomous explanatory 
variables that might affect the number of delegations Congress makes to executive 
agencies in any given title. I first control for whether the legislative and executive 
branches are controlled by the same party in the year in which the act was passed 
(“1” if yes, “0” otherwise). Second, I control for whether the U.S. House and Senate 
are controlled by the same party in the year in which an act was passed (“1” if yes, 
“0” otherwise).295 Table 1, below, summarizes the data used for the analyses. 
Table 1. Summary of variables used in statistical regression 
Variable Description 
Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Total Delegations Dependent Variable: The total number of 
delegations in a given title of a given act 
7.48 
(13.03) 
Permissive/Mandatory 
Delegations 
Dependent Variable: The total number of 
permissive/mandatory delegations in a given 
title of a given act 
4.21 
(6.92) 
“Crisis” Legislation Dichotomous (“1” if the act was passed 
amidst a securities crisis, “0” otherwise.) 
0.67 
(0.48) 
Divided President/Congress Dichotomous (“1” if the act was passed 
when Congress and the Presidency were 
controlled by the same party, “0” otherwise) 
0.73 
(0.45) 
Divided Senate/House Dichotomous (“1” if the act was passed 
when the House and the Senate were con-
trolled by the same party, “0” otherwise) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
The key question for the purposes of this Article is whether crisis influences 
congressional delegation even when controlling for partisan control of the federal 
government. Multivariate statistical analysis reveals that the presence of securities 
crises plays a statistically significant and substantively meaningful role in the number 
of delegations Congress makes to executive agencies in a given title of a given act, 
independent of political divisions in government. 
Figure 2, set forth below, uses the results from the multivariate regression 
                                                                                                                 
 
 295. We are not restricted to these methodological choices alone. First, one might suppose 
that the relative distance among the political institutions might be a superior predictor of 
delegatory behavior than the binary measures specified above. I estimated the below models 
again using absolute ideological distances between the federal branches of government instead 
of the dichotomous indicators specified within the text. I note that the main results of the 
analysis hold with respect to the predicted effect “crisis” legislating has on the number of 
delegations Congress makes to executive agencies. I do observe differences, however, in the 
predicted effect politics plays in the decisional process among the federal branches.  
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analysis, to show this phenomenon graphically. Each pane of the figure shows 
Congress’s predicted number of delegations to an agency, subdivided over whether 
a “crisis” exists (yes or no). The left-hand pane shows the predicted number of all 
types of delegations, and the right-hand pane shows the predicted number of “permis-
sive” and “mandatory” types of delegations. The y-axis of each pane shows the pre-
dicted number of delegations a title will include, holding political control of the 
House, Senate, and presidency constant. The x-axis shows whether the act was 
passed in the midst of a securities crisis. The dark lines in the plot and the shaded 
regions represent the statistical models’ best guess as to the effect the crisis variable 
has on the number of delegations (with 95% certainty).296 The dots represent 
statistical outliers beyond the 95% certainty threshold and should not be considered 
reliable estimates of the effect a crisis plays on Congress’s delegations. 
Analyzing the content of the graphs in the figure, we see a striking result 
—namely, that after accounting for political party control, postcrisis Congress is 
nearly twice as likely to delegate as when there is no crisis. In the fully specified 
model, the statistical estimator predicts that any given title of a congressional act 
should contain approximately 4.5 delegations when no securities crisis exists. The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 296. Indeed, uncertainty is the cornerstone to every statistical analysis. If the results did 
not vary by observations, we would not have recourse to statistical analysis because we would 
be certain of all outcomes.  
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Figure 2. The two graphs depict the predicted number of delegations Congress makes to its 
agencies. The left-hand pane shows predictions among all types of delegations. The right-hand 
pane shows the predicted number of “permissive” or “mandatory” delegations. The y-axes in 
each frame shows the statistical model’s predicted number of delegations, and the x-axes sub-
set these predictions according to whether a given act was passed amidst a securities crisis. 
Noncrisis Postcrisis Noncrisis Postcrisis 
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actual data suggest, however, that Congress will make closer to 8.5 delegations. That 
is, when Congress has legislated within the context of a securities crisis, the number 
of total delegations is nearly double what one would see in the absence of crisis. The 
right-hand pane shows a similar (even if not quite as strong) effect among all 
mandatory and permissive types of delegations. In the midst of a crisis, the model 
predicts that Congress should make approximately four mandatory or permissive 
delegations, compared to only three when there exists no similar crisis. That is, by 
moving into a postcrisis period, the statistical estimator predicts the total number of 
permissive or mandatory delegations to increase by approximately twenty-five 
percent. These findings (across both models) are statistically significant. And they 
indicate that the presence of a crisis has important substantive implications as to how 
the federal government regulates securities, who will determine the scope of those 
regulations, and how often delegated authority will be exercised. No less important, 
the political control variables I included in each of the multivariate analyses prove to 
be of little significance.297  
Table 2 presents the full results from the multivariate statistical analyses. I 
considered both the total number of delegations made in each title of every act, and 
I also considered the number of “permissive” or “mandatory” delegations in each 
title of every act. As such, the dependent variable in the regression models was the 
number of delegations in the titles of each act. I included three independent (or 
explanatory) variables in each of these models. First, I controlled for whether the act 
in question was passed in the wake of a securities crisis. Next, I controlled for politi-
cal factors relating to partisan control of the elected branches of the federal govern-
ment. More specifically, I controlled for whether Congress and the Executive were 
each controlled by one political party, and I also controlled for whether the House 
and the Senate were controlled by the same party. The results from each count model 
are included below in Table 2. 
The results included in the table represent coefficient estimates from the 
maximum likelihood estimators. Positive values mean that the presence of the varia-
ble has a positive effect on the number of congressional delegations, and negative 
values mean the opposite. The crucial point for present purposes is revealed by the 
“Crisis” Legislation/Total Delegations box. It is here that we encounter the key 
finding of this study—namely, that the existence of a crisis produces a statistically 
                                                                                                                 
 
 297. Indeed, neither political control variable achieved statistical significance. That is to 
say, we cannot conclude based upon this evidence that the political control of the presidency 
and/or the Congress has a noticeable effect on how Congress delegates authority to executive 
agencies, even when holding securities crises constant. Only in the model that analyzed 
mandatory or permissive delegations do we observe any political effect, but even this is slight. 
For example, the predicted effect of a political division between the president and Congress is 
negative (as hypothesized), but this effect is slight and arguably fails to achieve statistical 
significance. I do note, however, that the control for political divisions between the two cham-
bers of Congress achieves statistical significance in the model analyzing mandatory or 
permissive delegations. I find that, holding all other political and crisis control variables equal, 
moving from a united Congress to a partisan divided one (i.e., one party controls the House, 
another controls the Senate) results in an increase in the number of predicted delegations (by 
about one), as above hypothesized. The figure above demonstrates this phenomenon 
graphically. 
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significant increase in the delegation of congressional authority when all forms of 
delegation are taken into account.  
Table 2. Results from Multivariate Statistical Analysis. Notes: N=66. Values in the top portion 
of each cell represent MLE coefficient estimates, and values in parentheses indicate standard 
errors. Statistical significance values as follows: p < .001 (***), p < .050 (**), p < .100 (*). 
Variable Total Delegations Permissive/Mandatory 
“Crisis” Legislation   0.65*** 
 (0.13) 
  0.35** 
(0.16) 
Divided President/Congress -0.13 
(0.11) 
 -0.24* 
(0.14) 
Divided Senate/House 0.25 
(0.22) 
  0.57** 
(0.24) 
Intercept   1.61*** 
(0.12) 
  1.31*** 
(0.15) 
Log-Likelihood -516.68 -322.61 
C. Crisis and Delegation 
One obvious explanation for frequent delegation in postcrisis legislation is that in 
periods of crisis, Congress simply does not have the time to slow down and dictate 
precise policy prescriptions. Instead, it contents itself with big-picture matters and 
delegates the details to the agency. Indeed, this may well be a fair reading of the 
critique of bubble laws offered by Professors Romano, Ribstein, and Bainbridge: 
when Congress legislates under pressure it gets substantive policy wrong and per-
force delegates too much to the SEC. In noncrisis situations, cooler heads prevail, 
and Congress dictates because it has the time to get policy questions right. 
The data offer some support for this explanation. But that support is limited 
because only one act occurred in the midst of a crisis: SIPA (SOX occurred in the 
immediate wake of crisis). In addition, the story of SIPA is hard to square with the 
emergency-breeds-delegation thesis. It contained relatively little delegation 
—indeed, only nine instances of mandatory and permissive delegation, the third 
lowest in the entire period. In contrast, the Amendments of 1975 contained at least 
188 delegations, the highest number of delegations of any act. These were part of the 
bargain struck after the relevant crisis had passed, and Congress sought to address 
long-term concerns raised by the crisis. Apart from SIPA, Sarbanes-Oxley was the 
only other piece of legislation passed in a crisis-like environment—that is, amidst 
the fallout of the failure of Enron, the WorldCom bankruptcy lent fresh urgency to 
Congress’s efforts. Here there was a significant amount of delegation. Even so, in 
Dodd-Frank, which was enacted after the economy had passed through the throes of 
the financial crisis, even more delegations were made. 
On balance then, Congress passed two of its four crisis-inspired acts after the 
crisis had occurred. Yet it engaged in extensive delegation in each of those two cases. 
As to the other two enactments, the results were mixed: Sarbanes-Oxley, passed in 
response to the catalyst of WorldCom’s failure, delegated substantial authority to the 
governing agency, but SIPA did not. In sum, this pattern provides no significant sup-
port for the thesis that ongoing emergencies foster delegation; crisis-based 
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motivation, rather than merely midst-of-crisis, appears to be the key driver of 
congressional delegation. 
V. DISTINCTIVE STATUTES 
A closer look at the data reveals some deviations from the overall pattern, as 
indicated by Figures 3 and 4 below. Figure 3 graphs Congress’s mandatory and 
permissive delegations, act by act. Figure 4 shows Congress’s mandatory and 
permissive delegations, as wells as instances where Congress granted the SEC 
discretionary authority. Most notably, the Amendments of 1975, Dodd-Frank, and 
Sarbanes-Oxley—all crisis-related measures—conform to the dictation/delegation 
thesis by containing a large number of delegations. But SIPA does not. As to the 
noncrisis legislation, SBIIA, PSLRA, and SLUSA conform, but NSMIA and the 
JOBS
DF
SOX
NSMIA
PSLRA
SBIIA
1975
SIPA
0 50 100
Figure 3. Mandatory and Permissive Delegation 
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JOBS Act do not. The balance of this Part will attempt to account for these departures 
from the prevailing pattern. 
A. SIPA & NSMIA 
Why did SIPA—which was enacted in the midst of the Paperwork Crisis 
—embody very few delegations? The explanation is a simple one. At the time, Wall 
Street faced a crisis in public confidence as banks were unable to process the high 
volumes of paper that accompanied traditional stock transfers. Congress thus needed 
to act swiftly for a focused purpose—to reassure clients that, should their particular 
broker-dealer fail, they would not lose their money. And SIPA addressed this tar-
geted problem in a targeted way, by creating the SIPC to serve as a federal backstop. 
As part of the larger legislative bargaining, however, Congress required a future 
study of root causes of the problem to find better means to address them after the 
immediate crisis had been remedied. Thus SIPA was a stopgap solution that kicked 
much of the work down the road. The result was Congress’s follow-up legislation of 
1975, which contains more instances of delegation than any of the other securities 
laws enacted during the sample period. 
NSMIA also poses a special case, primarily because it presented the rare situation 
where an administrative agency came forward with the language of the Act. At the 
same time, the mutual fund industry and the SEC were allied against the states in 
seeking federal preemption of a then-operative patchwork of local securities regula-
tion. Thus NSMIA sprang out of an exceptional situation in which delegation to an 
agency represented the lesser of two evils for a sizable business constituency. Put 
another way, NSMIA was the product of an unusual alliance between regulatory 
JOBS
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1975
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Figure 4. Mandatory, Permissive, and Instances of Agency Discretion 
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officials and regulated entities, which produced gains for both. And the gains to the 
agency came in the form of enhanced discretionary regulatory power.  
B. JOBS Act: Two Laws in One 
Understanding the JOBS Act’s delegation story begins with recognizing a 
curiosity of the legislative process and result: the JOBS Act is the product of two 
separate and distinct forces. Half of the JOBS Act’s titles conform to the 
dictation/delegation pattern of noncrisis congressional dictation. These are the half 
of the JOBS Act backed by significant moneyed interests: banks and Silicon Valley. 
The other half of the Act contains far more delegation. This section will explore the 
reasons for such marked divergence in delegation in a single Act. 
1. Dictation in the JOBS Act 
a. Title I 
Title I, the catalyst for the JOBS Act’s passage, is perhaps the most prescriptive 
of its provisions. Moreover, many of Title I’s substantive provisions are drawn nearly 
verbatim from the suggestions of Kate Mitchell’s IPO Task Force report. The report 
recommended creating a new category of issuer, the emerging growth company 
(EGC), and detailed its defining characteristics (total annual gross revenue of less 
than $1 billion) and the manner for exiting EGC status.298 It identified particular 
disclosure rules to which EGCs should not be subject for five years.299 It specified 
that EGCs should be able to disclose two years of audited financials at IPO, instead 
of the customary three years.300  
Representative Stephen Fincher introduced the bill containing the Title I 
provisions on December 8, 2011,301 and its provisions hewed closely to the IPO Task 
Force’s recommendations. The Act defines emerging growth company using a spe-
cific metric: an issuer with total annual gross revenues of less than $1,000,000,000.302 
Title I similarly detailed the paths, including two suggested by the IPO Task Force 
report, by which an emerging growth company would shed its EGC status.303 
                                                                                                                 
 
 298. IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 252, at 20.  
 299. Id. at 21–23.  
 300. Id. at 22. 
 301. H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (as introduced in House of Representatives, Dec. 8, 2011). 
 302. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106 § 101(a), 126 Stat. 
306, 307 (2012).  
 303. And those four paths were detailed: 
(A) the last day of the fiscal year of the issuer during which it had total annual 
gross revenues of $1,000,000,000 (as such amount is indexed for inflation every 
5 years by the Commission to reflect the change in the Consumer Price Index for 
All Urban Consumers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, setting the 
threshold to the nearest 1,000,000) or more; (B) the last day of the fiscal year of 
the issuer following the fifth anniversary of the date of the first sale of common 
equity securities of the issuer pursuant to an effective registration statement under 
this title; (C) the date on which such issuer has, during the previous 3-year period, 
2017] DICTATION AND DELEGATION IN SECURITIES REGULATION 485 
 
Title I also itemizes specific ways to relax the regulatory requirements for EGCs 
during the going-public process in highly specific ways that mirror the IPO Task 
Force’s recommendations. First, EGCs may present two years of audited financial 
statements, rather than the three required of normal corporations.304 Second, follow-
ing the IPO Task Force’s suggestion,305 the title expands the permissible range of 
communications between the issuer and both analysts and potential investors.306 
Third, Title I tracks the IPO Task Force’s recommendations specifying that these 
accommodations are “opt-in” rights and that emerging growth companies can forgo 
a particular exemption and instead comply with the normal issuer requirements.307 
Finally, and again taking a cue from the IPO Task Force report, it permits emerging 
growth companies to file confidential draft registration statements with the SEC prior 
to public filing.308 This accommodation allows both the issuer and underwriter a 
chance to gauge the SEC’s concerns with an offering prior to making the registration 
statement public.309  
And that is not all. Title I details the exact provisions of the 1934 Act from which 
EGCs are exempt, provisions suggested by the IPO Task Force report: executive 
compensation, proxies, auditor rotation, and the much-reviled section 404 internal 
controls audit.310 One could easily imagine that Congress would task the SEC with 
examining its rules and using its expertise to determine which of its rules warranted 
suspension for EGCs, engaging in an analysis of their relative utility given the bur-
dens they place on issuers and the benefits they provide to investors. Yet Title I, far 
from deferring to agency expertise, dictated the law on its own—after itself taking 
dictation from the IPO Task Force report. 
Title I makes only one, begrudging, allowance for the exercise of agency 
discretion. It states that after an EGC goes public, subsequent accounting rules that 
the Financial Accounting and Standards Board adopts “[will] not apply [to the EGC] 
unless the Commission determines that the application of such additional require-
ments is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, after considering the protec-
tion of investors and whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.”311 The provenance of this lone concession to agency discretion 
can also be traced to the IPO Task Force report.312  
                                                                                                                 
 
issued more than $1,000,000,000 in non-convertible debt; or (D) the date on 
which such issuer is deemed to be a ‘large accelerated filer’, as defined in section 
240.12b–2 of title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor thereto. 
Id. 
 304. Id. § 102(b)(1). 
 305. IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 252, at 28. 
 306. JOBS Act § 105.  
 307. Id. § 107; IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 252, at 22. 
 308. Id. § 106; IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 252, at 29. 
 309. There is reason to believe that this feature is the most popular and useful of the JOBS 
Act Title I accommodations. See Usha Rodrigues, The Effect of the JOBS Act on Underwriting 
Spreads, 102 KY. L.J. 925, 933 (2013–2014). 
 310. JOBS Act §§ 102–104.  
 311. Id. § 104.  
 312. See IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 252, at 24 (recommending that the PCAOB should 
consider “cost of implementation for [EGCs]” among other things). 
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The bottom line is that Title I, using the IPO Task Force report as a template, 
created a new, easier path to public status for small companies—the very companies 
that pose the highest risk of defrauding investors. The Act exempts these companies 
from specific SEC regulations and articulates a less onerous path to the public mar-
kets. And the rules for securing such an exemption are detailed in the act itself, free 
from tinkering by agency officials—just what Silicon Valley wanted.  
b. Title V 
Title V represents another offensive deregulatory push, on a different front and 
by a different industry. The legislative history of Title V illustrates how attractive 
dictating, as opposed to delegating, legislation can be for regulated firms. Title V 
was enacted against the backdrop of section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act, 
which had required corporations with over 500 shareholders of record to register with 
the SEC—thus in effect coercing them to go public.313 Both debate on Capitol Hill 
and behind-the-scenes campaign contribution data reveal how worrisome this 
requirement was to some firms. 
Firms approaching the 500-shareholder number, including Pennsylvania-based 
convenience store Wawa, Inc., were particularly concerned about section 12(g).314  
But section 12(g) posed an even greater problem for SecondMarket, Inc., a relatively 
new company that provided a secondary market for trading the shares of private 
companies.315 The more private companies allowed their shares to be traded on 
SecondMarket, the more their shareholder rolls began to bump up against section 
12(g)’s threshold.316 Thus, the law threatened to drive pre-IPO companies away from 
SecondMarket’s exchange completely.  
Wawa and SecondMarket responded in disparate and revealing ways to the threat 
that section 12(g) posed to their businesses. SecondMarket’s CEO testified before 
Congress to persuade it of the seriousness of the problem (without mentioning the 
specific interest his firm had in raising the threshold).317 He also made well-timed 
campaign contributions. Representative Jim Himes (D-CT) introduced an act on May 
24, 2011, proposing to raise the registration threshold for banks and bank holding 
companies (as Title VI ultimately would do) and to require the SEC to study the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 313. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565, 566–
67 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1) (2006)).  
 314. See ANNE KIM, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INST., 501 SHAREHOLDERS: REDEFINING 
“PUBLIC” COMPANIES TO HELP EMERGING FIRMS 6 (2011), http://progressivepolicy.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2011/12/12.2011-Kim_501-Shareholders_Redefining-Public-Companies-to 
-Help-Emerging-Firms.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8UD-82KP] (describing Wawa’s struggles 
with the 500-shareholder cap); see also, Usha R. Rodrigues, The Once and Future Irrelevancy 
of Section 12(g), 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1529, 1556 (2015). 
 315. Rodrigues, supra note 314, at 1538.  
 316. Id. at 1539. 
 317. See Legislative Proposals To Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and Job 
Creation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the 
H. Comm. on Fin. Sers., 112th Cong. 35,  (2001) [hereinafter Legislative Proposals Hearing] 
(statement of Barry Silbert, Founder & Chief Executive Officer, SecondMarket, Inc.). 
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thresholds applicable to all companies.318 Within two weeks two SecondMarket 
employees—its CEO and its head of public affairs—each donated $1000 to 
Representative Himes,319 even though neither individual had ever before made an 
out-of-state political donation to any candidate.320 
Senator David Schweikert (R-AZ) introduced legislation on June 14, 2011, 
proposing not agency action (as had H.R. 1965), but an outright legislative fix: rais-
ing the threshold to 1000 and excluding employees and accredited investors from the 
count entirely.321 Accredited, or wealthy, investors322 were the only individuals who 
could trade on SecondMarket’s exchange.323 Therefore, by definition, no 
SecondMarket transferees would count for the purposes of the Schweikert’s new bill. 
Notably, SecondMarket’s CEO had donated another $1000 to Representative 
Schweikert only one day before he introduced the bill.324  
Recall that the other main corporate advocate for what would become Title V was 
Pennsylvania-based Wawa.325 Wawa’s employees were active in making campaign 
contributions.326 But of particular note is an exchange that took place at a hearing 
before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, involving 
both Wawa’s Chief Financial and Administrative Officer Christopher Gheysens and 
Meredith Cross, Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance. This ex-
change brought into clear focus the merits of dictation versus delegation from the 
perspective of corporate entities.327  
Senator Pat Toomey (R-PA), acting as an advocate for his local corporate 
constituent, asked Gheysens whether it made “any difference to you guys” whether 
section 12(g)’s threshold was raised by Congress or the SEC.328 Gheysens replied: 
                                                                                                                 
 
 318. See infra Part V.B.1.c. 
 319. Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, FED. ELECTION 
COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/advindsea.shtml (search “Employer” field 
for “SecondMarket”) (listing contributions by Mark Murphy on June 6, 2011 and Barry Silbert 
on June 7, 2011, each in the amount of $1000 to Rep. Himes). 
 320. Id.  
 321. Private Company Flexibility and Growth Act, H.R. 2167, 112th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2011). 
 322. Individuals with a net annual income of over $200,000 or a total net worth of over 
one million dollars may invest in securities that are not registered, provided that those securi-
ties meet the general disclosure requirements of Rule 502. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) 
(2016). 
 323. Rodrigues, supra note 314, at 1539. 
 324. Individual Contributions Arranged by Type, Giver, then Recipient, supra note 319 (list-
ing a contribution by Barry Silbert on June 13, 2011 in the amount of $1000 to Rep. 
Schweikert). 
 325. Rodrigues, supra note 314, at 1556. 
 326. See Usha R. Rodrigues, The Price of Corruption, 31 J.L. & POL. 45, 62 (2015) 
(“Wawa employees were not as politically engaged as SecondMarket's employees, but six of 
them made a total of $11,000 in donations to the Friends of Pat Toomey political action cam-
paign on June 27, 2012, two months after the passage of the JOBS Act.” (footnote omitted)). 
 327. See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors 
—Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 
29–30 (2011) [hereinafter Spurring Job Growth Hearing]. 
 328. Id. at 29. 
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“It does not. Either Congress or by rule of the SEC, the process to us, we are indiffer-
ent. The importance for us really is the timeline. We are at an inflection point.”329 
Senator Toomey then asked the SEC’s Cross to provide “any sense for a 
timeframe . . . by which the agency would reach a decision about raising the 
[500-]shareholder limit.”330 Cross answered: 
[W]hen the limit was originally put in, it followed a robust study to 
understand the costs and the benefits and the economic consequences of 
a change in the rule. So we are doing that now. That takes time, I am 
afraid. So I expect that we would get the work done on the study during 
2012, and then the Commission, if they decide they want to change the 
rule, would need to put out a rule proposal. So it is at least . . . more than 
a year away.331 
Toomey responded, “I just have to say that is disappointing.”332 
Toomey may have been disappointed, but he should not have been surprised. 
Wawa faced the necessity of reducing its shareholder count by way of a reverse stock 
split that would cost it $40 million.333 Given the exigencies of Wawa’s timeline and 
the inherent delays of agency rule making, Wawa was in fact not “indifferent” at all. 
It needed deregulation posthaste—which meant baking an increase in the shareholder 
threshold directly into the legislation. And that is just what Wawa got in Title V of 
the JOBS Act. 
Title V’s ultimate language represented something of a compromise: it raised the 
proposed threshold to 2000, or 500 unaccredited investors.334 Yet the important point 
for our purposes is what did not change: that Congress would dictate the appropriate 
trigger number, taking that task away from agency experts even as the SEC was 
studying this very issue. Members of Congress offered some anecdotal evidence 
about the burdens section 12(g) placed on firms.335 But the empirical data do not 
support the argument that a large number of firms were forced to go public by the 
former section 12(g) threshold of 500 shareholders.336 Thus, as with Title I, a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at 30. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 34; see also David Ingram & Alexandra Alper, Wawa, Wegmans, Other Private 
Companies Ratchet up Lobbying Efforts To Keep Finances Secret,  HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 
29, 2011, 7:26 PM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/29/private-companies-lobbying 
_n_1175418.html [https://perma.cc/P9QT-7VTN] (last updated Feb. 28, 2012). 
 334.  Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §501, 126 Stat. 
306, 325 (2012). 
 335. See Rodrigues, supra note 314, at 1541 (“One House representative referred to ‘a 
company in Newport, Vermont, that has been under a lot of regulatory pressure. They can't go 
over that 500 threshold.’ Montana Senator Tester cited a seventy-five year old ‘Montana-
grown company’ that ‘has always believed in rewarding its employees so they can have a stake 
in the success of the firm, which now operates in 16 States,’ but faced the choice of ‘costly 
public registration or potentially eliminating existing employee shareholders.’” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 336. Id. 
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cohesive interest group succeeded in having its desired policy result encoded directly 
into the JOBS Act. 
c. Title VI 
Banks were the force behind Title VI, which specifically sought to allow banks to 
remain private longer337 and to make it easier for public banks to go private or “go 
dark.” Title VI originally sought to raise section 12(g)’s threshold to 2000 share-
holders for banks and bank holding companies.338 In a case of convergent evolution, 
Title V ultimately came to the same result with respect to all public firms. Title VI 
did relax one additional requirement solely for banks and bank holding companies, 
however, and that relates to making it easier for them to “go dark”—that is, for public 
companies to delist from a public exchange and return to private ownership. 
Prior to the passage of the JOBS Act, once a company went public it could only 
go private again if it had fewer than 300 shareholders of record.339 Professor Edward 
Rock argued that by making it relatively easy to go public but relatively difficult to 
go dark—because of the necessity for having 300 shareholders or fewer—U.S. 
securities laws created a “credible commitment” to public investors that once a firm 
went public, it would remain public.340 Rock thus urged that the 300-shareholder exit 
level was a key feature of U.S. securities law.341 Title VI of the JOBS Act quadrupled 
the going-dark threshold to 1200, and thereby weakened that credible commitment—
at least, for banks and bank holding companies.342  
While these proposed amendments may seem technical, they were of great 
importance to the banking community. Debate in Congress emphasized the burdens 
these purportedly out-of-date regulations placed upon small, community banks, by 
forcing them to go public once they reach 500 shareholders. As one witness stated: 
“Community banks . . . are the life blood of our local economies. . . . These are the 
banks we need to see lending to small businesses and homeowners, but they are 
hamstrung in their attempt to raise capital by outdated SEC registration requirements. 
This one is over half a century old.”343  
Representatives stressed the problems that the 500-shareholder threshold posed 
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for banks: “they are then forced to lower their number of shareholders by buying 
back stock which, all too often, means losing local shareholders who keep these 
banks connected with their local communities.”344 Allowing community banks more 
freedom to take on new investors, Representative Womack argued, removes a barrier 
to capital formation.345  
Senator Kay Hutchison (R-TX) introduced Senate Bill 556, on March 10, 2011, 
and its substantive provisions survived unscathed in the JOBS Act.346 On May 24, 
2011, Representative James Himes (D-CT) introduced an identically worded 
companion bill in the House.347 From their inception, both bills dictated to regulators 
regarding the main purpose of legislation, providing that for banks and bank holding 
companies, the shareholder registration threshold be raised to 2000 persons and 
raising the threshold for deregistration from 300 to 1200 persons. 
Title VI tracks the language of the original House and Senate bills almost 
verbatim. Although the title directs the SEC to “issue final regulations to implement 
this title and the amendments made by this title,”348 there was in effect almost nothing 
for the SEC to do except alter its previous regulation as Title VI directed. Indeed, 
according to my coding scheme, there is not a single instance of delegation in Title 
VI. It simply dictates the law. 
This dictation is all the more noteworthy because Congress was well aware that 
the SEC was in fact at the time studying the very question of shareholder registration 
thresholds. The head of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance testified to law-
makers that the agency was in the process of gathering the relevant data.349 Congress 
thus preempted any agency action—and without having before it any empirical data 
as to the kind of banks and bank shareholders that would be affected by deregulation. 
Title VI illustrates the dictation/delegation thesis in action. How large a company 
should become before being forced to go public is a serious question. Data were 
available. The SEC was looking into the matter. Congress could easily have dele-
gated the issue to the SEC. But no crisis loomed and regulated banks saw the oppor-
tunity to “play offense” in seeking a favorable regulatory change. That change 
required forestalling agency action and their efforts to secure that result survived 
unscathed from the bill’s introduction to become enshrined in statutory law. 
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2. Delegation in the JOBS Act 
Thus far we have seen how Silicon Valley, the financial industry, Wawa, and 
SecondMarket mounted a successful campaign to dictate preferred changes in the 
JOBS Act. But other groups were less successful in playing offense: while they se-
cured some regulatory wins, they came at the cost of large measures of delegation. 
To understand the importance of the changes wrought by these titles, the reader 
should have clearly in mind the pre-JOBS Act rules of investing. Prior to the JOBS 
Act, federal law limited the average investor to investing in the shares of publicly 
traded companies that have made extensive, and expensive, disclosures with the 
SEC.350 Only accredited investors could invest in private firms.351 And private firms 
could not “generally advertise” for investors—that is, solicit the general public for 
investment funds.352 Instead, they had to use password-protected websites, private 
brokers, and other methods designed to protect the general public from learning 
about these ventures.353 Title II of the JOBS Act eliminated this ban on general 
solicitation; Title III for the first time allowed the general public to invest in still-
private firms; and Title IV increased the amount private firms could raise from 
investors.  
a. Title II 
Enacting Title II required industry members to persuade Congress to allow for 
general solicitation—that is, advertising to the general public. Naval Ravikant, a co-
founder of AngelList, was a key backer of Title II, which in the end relaxed the ban 
on general solicitation. In Ravikant’s account, his team “approach[ed] the problem 
like a startup.”354 Traditionally a bill’s backers submit Word documents with names 
demonstrating support for their position. Indeed, unions submitted such a document 
with 3600 opposing the measure. 355 But Ravikant organized a 36-hour viral Twitter 
campaign, and had 5000 investors and entrepreneurs sign the petition.356 It included 
data about signatories, including home district and campaign contribution history.357 
Ravikant called it “beautiful and visual,” boasting that they “crushed it,” using 
technology as a weapon.358 Press accounts credited the success of passage to 
Ravikant’s viral push.359 
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In terms of lobbying, Ravikant took an equally nontraditional approach: even 
though he was told “that’s not the way it’s done,” they paid lobbyists on a contingent 
fee-like basis; these lobbyists, in other words, were entitled to full payment only if 
the legislation passed.360 Thus Ravikant played a different kind of offense from the 
traditional method employed by the other interest groups lobbying for Titles I, V, 
and VI. 
Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) introduced the initial bill.361 In stark contrast to the 
elaborate legislative dictation of Titles I, V, and VI, it tasked the SEC with revising 
its rules so that “the prohibition against general solicitation or general advertis-
ing . . . shall not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant to section 
230.506, provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.” 362 
In other words, it delegated the main question to the SEC. The devil of general 
solicitation was in the detail of how to allow private firms to offer to the general 
public while ensuring that only investors of the requisite high income or net worth to 
qualify as accredited investors actually purchased the stock.  
Requiring that any purchasers be accredited investors clearly presupposed some 
sort of verification process. Representative Maxine Waters (D-CA) was concerned 
about sales to unaccredited investors who might be “seduced by public advertising” 
and take advantage of the laxity of self-certification procedures to lie about their 
assets in order to qualify as accredited investors.363 Thus, she introduced an amend-
ment that would become part of the final bill, tasking the SEC with defining what 
constituted “reasonable steps to verify” that purchasers are accredited investors.364 
Representative Waters’s amendment made clear that the SEC had work to do in this 
arena, and expressly delegated to the agency the duty of figuring out the best mecha-
nism. And that caused delay. Although the SEC proposed rules on these topics on 
August 29, 2012, it was not until it promulgated final rules on July 10, 2013 that the 
ban on general solicitation was lifted, effective September 13, 2013.365 
Thus, for all Ravikant’s boasting about unconventional lobbying choices, what 
Title II’s history shows is that, while success fees may incentivize a lobbyist to get a 
bill passed, they might well result in a bill that can pass Congress easily—one that 
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kicks the hard questions of implementation to the agency, where they can be delayed 
and made more complicated. The traditional industry approach to lobbying, on dis-
play in Titles I, V, and VI, resulted in the safest, surest, and swiftest deregulatory 
result: dictation. 
b. Title III: Crowdfunding 
Before 2012, the only way the general public—that is, individuals who did not 
qualify as accredited investors—could obtain a share of the equity of a corporation 
was when it went public. Yet as crowdsourcing—whether by way of donations 
(KickStarter, Indiegogo, or Gofundme) or by loans made with interest (Prosper 
Marketplace) or interest-free (Kiva)—became more mainstream, it whetted the pub-
lic’s appetite for the chance to invest their dollars for profit in the equity of private 
companies. As Paul Spinrad, an early supporter of federal deregulation to permit 
crowdsourcing, put it: 
The original federal laws governing the sale of securities were written in 
the 1930s, when people had no way to fact-check a smooth telephone 
voice and some fancy letterhead mailed with a New York City postmark. 
But now, in a world of information ubiquity, these antiquated investor 
protections were stifling innovation, economic health, community, and 
the pursuit of happiness.366 
The history of the legalization of crowdfunding is an irresistibly underdog tale. In 
true entrepreneurial fashion, Spinrad, while “[b]rowsing the SEC website,” hit upon 
the idea of submitting a public petition for a crowdfunding website.367 Spinrad part-
nered with the Sustainable Economies Law Center and on July 1, 2010, filed a “Peti-
tion for Rulemaking: Exempt securities offerings up to $100,000 with $100 maxi-
mum per investor from registration,” financed (fittingly enough) by the donations of 
fifty-two individuals.368 But while Spinrad provided some initial intellectual impetus 
for legalizing crowdfunding, he characterized his work to further a crowdfunding 
exemption as “a hobby,” explaining, “Between working in perpetual crunch mode at 
[his regular job], having two preschool-age kids, and not having a dishwasher, there’s 
no way I could do the massive amount of Washington DC face-time that is mandatory 
for any federal law change.”369  
Enter Sherwood Neiss, Jason Best, and Zak Cassady-Dorion, who created a 
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regulatory framework they named “Startup Exemption.”370 As described in their 
short video titled “The Story Behind Crowdfund Investing (Or ‘How 3 guys changed 
the rules of the game in 460 days’),”371 the exemption they proposed would be limited 
to $10,000 per individual investor, with firms able to raise a total of $1 million 
through crowdfunding.372 Thanks to “77 year” old regulations, it would take “an Act 
of Congress” to change the rules and, as the video puts it, “What can 3 regular guys 
get done in Washington?”373 
The video goes on to observe that there are three “must-haves” needed to get 
anything done in Washington:  
1. “[a] large team of D.C. insiders & lobbyists (However Jason, Zak, and Woodie 
don’t live in D.C. and don’t have any political experience.)”;374 
2. “[a] million-dollar budget” (as opposed to the $54,273 the trio spent on fifteen 
trips to DC and the November 2011 rally, including $273 for coffee);375 and 
3. “[a]t least 5 years from start to finish” (it took 460 days).376 
On September 8, 2011, President Obama endorsed crowdfunding,377 and on the 
same day the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)  
signed a report that supported a $1 million crowdfunding exemption.378 Notably, the 
Occupy Wall Street movement began September 17 of the same year.379 With the 
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rise of this populist movement—with its anti-big bank, pro-“99%” message—
crowdfunding’s promise of rejecting traditional funding mechanisms in favor of “the 
people” continued to gain traction. 
On September 14, Patrick McHenry (R-NC) introduced a three-page bill that 
allowed ordinary investors to invest the lesser of $10,000 or 10% of their annual 
income or net worth in companies seeking to raise $5 million or less.380 The initial 
bill McHenry introduced did, in fact, dictate. It specified that companies could rely 
on investors’ certification of their own income and that any such investors would be 
excluded from Section 12(g)’s shareholder of record cap.381 It also included no 
delegation of authority to the SEC. 
But Title III did not maintain this “short and sweet” character for long. In contrast 
to McHenry’s original crowdfunding bill, the final language of Title III delegates 
many details to the SEC. Under the second subsection alone, the SEC is called upon 
to take the following actions with respect to crowdfunding intermediaries:  
1.  provide whatever disclosures, “including disclosures related to risks and other 
investor education materials, as the Commission shall, by rule, determine 
appropriate”;382  
2. establish standards for investor-education information;383 
3. determine whether it is appropriate for crowdfunding investors to demonstrate 
to an intermediary an understanding on any “other matters”;384 
4. formulate “measures to reduce the risk of fraud . . . including obtaining a 
background and securities enforcement regulatory history check on each of-
ficer, director, and person holding more than twenty percent of the outstanding 
equity of every issuer whose securities are offered by such person;”385  
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5. establish a period before any sale of securities before which information must 
be provided to the SEC and potential investors;386 
6. determine when it is appropriate to allow crowdfunding investors to cancel 
their commitment;387 
7. make efforts the SEC determines appropriate to ensure that no investor in a 
twelve-month period has purchased securities that exceed the investment 
limits;388 
8. determine what steps to protect the privacy of investor information are 
appropriate.389 
Indeed, Title III contains twenty-three separate provisions whereby Congress 
entrusts the SEC with promulgating a rule or articulating a standard in connection 
with crowdfunding.390  
One explanation for the SEC’s substantial rule-making role in Title III is that the 
crowdfunding legislation was the most hotly debated of all the JOBS Act provisions. 
Democratic legislators, in particular, were alert to the danger of exposing ordinary 
investors to the risks of investing in private companies.391 Equally noteworthy is that 
Title III was not of significant interest to Silicon Valley, the banks, and the stock 
exchanges that had lobbied hard for Titles I, V, and VI.392 Indeed, these repeat players 
took a negative view of the radical crowdfunding proposal due to fears that it would 
lead to the demise of the larger legislative package.  
To be sure, even while Title III contains many delegations of rule-making power, 
a delegation does not necessarily translate into the grant of actual policy-making 
authority. Many scholars, among them Steven Bradford393 and Joan Heminway,394 
have argued that Congress placed undue burdens on crowdfunding regulation when 
it delegated it to the SEC, by tying the agency’s hands in ways that rendered 
crowdfunding unworkable. These criticisms have merit: indeed, in Title III Congress 
was quite dictatorial in a manner that hamstrung much of the promise of equity 
crowdfunding. But dictatorial and dictating are not the same thing: All I mean to say 
when characterizing Title III as an example of extensive delegation is that Congress 
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did not make it self-executing, and delegated many of the details to the SEC. Backed 
by underdogs as Title III was, delegation was probably the best it could get.  
c. Title IV 
Title IV represents something of a puzzle: it is the odd case where sophisticated 
players contented themselves with delegation instead of dictating in the statute itself. 
Title IV revitalized Regulation A, a longstanding registration exemption under the 
Securities Act of 1933.395 Before the JOBS Act, Regulation A allowed small compa-
nies to raise up to five million dollars in capital but required them to file an offering 
statement with the SEC and provide an offering circular to potential investors.396 The 
issuing company was also required to adhere to each state’s blue-sky laws.397 These 
requirements were less onerous than the costly requirements of full registration under 
the Securities Act of 1933, but over time they proved not to be worth the trouble.398 
In 1997, there were fifty-six qualified Regulation A offerings.399 By 2011, there was 
only one.400 In the meantime, support grew to revise Regulation A.401 The result of 
this process was Title IV of the JOBS Act. That title increased the amount of capital 
private firms can raise Regulation A offerings from $5 million to $50 million.402 
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& EXCH. COMM’N, 2009 ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS 
CAPITAL FORMATION: FINAL REPORT 14–18, 17 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus 
/gbfor28.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP6Z-3NHV]. At the 2010 meeting, three out of thirty-six 
recommendations advocated for distinct changes to Regulation A. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
2010 ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL 
FORMATION: FINAL REPORT 17–22 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/gbfor29.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZEM2-9LSQ] (recommending some type of change to Regulation A in 
recommendations 4A, 5, 7B, and 16). 
 402. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules To Facilitate Smaller 
Companies’ Access to Capital (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015 
-49.html [https://perma.cc/8NF5-HC85]. 
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Title IV has an out-of-step quality because it contains several instances of 
delegation to the SEC, despite its support from sophisticated players. The surface 
explanation is that sophisticated players themselves asked for these delegations, but 
the more complex explanation relates to resistance that interest groups, such as the 
NASAA, expressed to the idea of broad federal preemption. 
With regard to the surface explanation, the following chronology is telling. In 
December 2010, the House Financial Services Committee conducted a hearing 
unambiguously titled A Proposal To Increase the Offering Limit Under SEC 
Regulation A.403 William Hambrecht, founder, Chairman, and CEO of WR 
Hambrecht and Company testified,404 as did Michael Lempres, of SVB (Silicon 
Valley Bank) Financial Group, and Congresswoman Anna Eshoo, whose district en-
compassed Silicon Valley.405 Surprisingly, both Hambrecht and Lempres urged 
Congress to explicitly increase the Regulation A ceiling while allowing the SEC to 
promulgate detailed rules.406 Lempres stated: “[T]he ideal solution would be a 
mandate from Congress to raise the offering limit for Regulation A and to set a mini-
mum ceiling figure. I do like the idea of revisiting it periodically and deferring to 
SEC the terms and conditions.”407 Hambrecht agreed:  
I do think, though, that there are some time pressures here, and that 
everybody would like to see this get going quickly. 
 I think if the SEC has a rule change, they have to go through a process 
that could take some time, and I would think a congressional mandate 
would move it quickly, and then definitely leave the SEC to implement 
it and to change whatever they see fit to change . . . .408  
Hambrecht is a sophisticated Silicon Valley presence; he founded what became 
Hambrecht & Quist, the firm that took Apple and Adobe Systems public and 
pioneered the auction IPO.409 It is unclear why he would assert that a congressional 
mandate that would raise the limit to $50 million, coupled with SEC rule making, 
would ultimately result in a “quick” change in the law. Lempres, a Silicon Valley 
Bank representative, was presumably also aware of the issue. Yet in the 2010 
                                                                                                                 
 
 403. A Proposal To Increase the Offering Limit Under SEC Regulation A: Hearing Before 
the H. Fin. Servs. Comm., 111th Cong. (2010). 
 404. Id. at 8 (statement of William R. Hambrecht, Founder, Chairman & CEO, WR 
Hambrecht & Co.). 
 405. Id. at 3, 10. Hambrecht later stated to a reporter that Eshoo was the “real prime mover” 
in assembling the hearing. Timothy P. Carney, Want a Voice in Washington? Invest in a 
Politician, WASH. EXAMINER (Dec. 12, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com 
/want-a-voice-in-washington-invest-in-a-politician/article/108230 [https://perma.cc/22GY-3EZ9]. 
 406. A Proposal To Increase the Offering Limit Under SEC Regulation A, supra note 403, 
at 22.  
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. (emphasis added). 
 409. Matthew J. Belvedere, Google Made More IPO Money My Way: Bill Hambrecht, 
CNBC (Aug. 19, 2014, 10:58 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/19/google-made-more 
-ipo-money-my-way-bill-hambrecht.html [https://perma.cc/T2YM-TJBB]; see also About 
WR Hambrecht + Co., WR HAMBRECHT + CO., https://wrhambrecht.com/about/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2Q43-F3NM]. 
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hearing, they asked only for Congress to raise the overall threshold; the details they 
were content to leave with the SEC. 
Perhaps Hambrecht knew that House Democrats would not have supported a bill 
that dictated blue-sky-law preemption at the congressional level as opposed to by 
way of SEC action. Indeed, there are several indications that Title IV would not have 
garnered the bipartisan support it needed to pass in both chambers of Congress had 
it explicitly dictated blue-sky law preemption. At a subcommittee hearing in 2011, 
AFL-CIO spokesman Damon Silvers was openly hostile toward the bill and the pro-
spect of less consumer protection.410 Congressmen Lynch (D-MA) expressly en-
dorsed Mr. Silvers’s views.411 Additionally, when the bill moved from the committee 
to the House floor in early 2011, the Democrats signaled that they would fight federal 
preemption, reasoning that state blue-sky laws protected investors.412 In May of 
2014, Representative McHenry (R-NC) introduced a bill to dictate blue-sky preemp-
tion, but the bill ultimately languished in the Democrat-controlled Senate.413 Finally, 
while it did not make much of an appearance in the legislative debate, the NASAA 
lobbied aggressively against blue-sky law preemption throughout the SEC’s ensuing 
rule-making process.414  
Whether because of political resistance, or because its backers did not ask for 
dictation, in Title IV Congress delegated the question of federal preemption to the 
SEC. It was not until December of 2013 that the SEC proposed rules—rules that, 
notably, provided for exemption from the operation of all state blue-sky laws.415 
                                                                                                                 
 
 410. Legislative Proposals To Promote Job Creation, Capital Formation and Market 
Certainty: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Entities of 
the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. at 16 (2011) (statement of Damon A. Silvers, Policy 
Director and Special Counsel, ALF-CIO stating that Title IV “should be called the ‘Promote 
Penny Stock Fraud Act.’”); id. at 17 (framing the committee’s proposed bill as a “systematic 
effort to strip the SEC of the resources necessary to protect American investors”). 
 411. Id. at 17 (“I want to associate myself—and I do this rarely—but I want to associate 
myself with the remarks of Mr. Silvers.”). This is not altogether surprising because Massachu-
setts used merit review to bar its residents from buying Apple stock in the 1980s because it 
was deemed to be too risky. Samuel Guzik, The State of Massachusetts vs. Regulation A+: 
State Regulators Take the SEC to Court, CROWDFUND INSIDER (May 26, 2015, 8:15 AM), 
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/05/68299-the-state-of-massachusetts-vs-regulation-
a-state-regulators-take-the-sec-to-court/ [https://perma.cc/766K-A2GY]. 
 412. H.R. REP. NO. 112-206, at 13 (2011), http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles 
/hr1070hreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/XC97-DCAC] (“Regulation A securities are sometimes 
high-risk offerings that may be susceptible to fraud, making the protections provided by state 
review essential. To address these concerns, the Democrats offered an amendment to clarify 
that state securities would only be preempted if the Regulation A security is sold on an 
exchange or sold only to a qualified purchaser. While that amendment was defeated, we will 
continue to work to ensure that the final bill provides adequate oversight.”). 
 413. Guzik, supra note 411. 
 414. JD Alois, NASAA Continues To Lobby SEC on Blue Sky Review & Title IV of the 
JOBS Act, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Feb. 28, 2015, 11:19 AM), http://www.crowdfundinsider 
.com/2015/02/63544-nasaa-continues-to-lobby-sec-on-blue-sky-review-title-iv-of-the-jobs-act/ 
[https://perma.cc/H54G-NG6L]. 
 415. Kiran Lingam, The Reg A+ Bombshell: $50M Unaccredited Equity Crowdfunding 
Title IV Takes Center Stage, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Mar. 25, 2015, 1:20 PM), http://www 
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Thus, as with general solicitation and crowdfunding, delegation meant delay. How-
ever, in this case, the bill’s backers ultimately achieved at the agency level the federal 
preemption that it would have been difficult to attain in Congress. Perhaps in this 
case Hambrecht and his Silicon Valley allies made the shrewd choice that delegation 
was the better part of valor.  
3. Data  
The data in Figures 5 and 6, which split the JOBS Act into Titles I, V, and VI, on 
the one hand, and II, III, and IV, on the other, confirm that indeed, the JOBS Act is, 
in delegation terms, really two acts. Almost all of the delegations brought about by 
the Act occur in Titles II, III, and IV. Kate Mitchell’s IPO Task Force backed Title 
I, and that title contained the sole permissive delegation in Titles I, V, or VI. Title V, 
backed by SecondMarket and Wawa, contained no delegations or agency discretion 
of any kind. And neither did Title VI, which loosened section 12(g) requirements for 
financial institutions. 
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CONCLUSION 
The dictation/delegation thesis posits that the political economy of securities 
regulation is more complicated than prior scholarship suggests. Professors Romano, 
Ribstein, and Bainbridge may be correct that “bubble laws” follow financial crises, 
but these bubble laws often delegate much of the real implementation work to 
administrative agencies. At the agency level, regulation is necessarily delayed, and 
may be diluted and disputed as well. On the flipside, in noncrisis times, it may well 
be possible for industry members to secure deregulation at the congressional level 
—and, in these instances, the resulting legislation will tend to dictate. Even 
controlling for divisions between Congress and the executive, and within the legisla-
tive branch, whether a crisis gives rise to legislation is a statistically significant 
predictor of legislative delegation.  
To be sure, the data show that the dictation/delegation thesis does not play out in 
a lockstep fashion. If the genesis for a bill comes from an administrative agency and 
delegation is a lesser evil than the status quo of state regulation—as was the case 
with NSMIA—resulting legislation can contain significant delegation.416 Likewise, 
even in the midst of a genuine crisis, Congress will sometimes eschew delegation in 
an effort to move swiftly and directly, with a focused goal in mind, as it did with 
SIPA.417 Finally, even acts like the JOBS Act—adopted in a noncrisis setting—may 
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reflect a mix of dictation and delegation strategies.418 Here, dictation-oriented 
sophisticated players backed the core of the Act, but supplementary provisions were 
added to it by less experienced political actors more willing to countenance agency 
oversight. And, in the case of Title IV, delegation may have been proved the best 
offense after all, since it ultimately secured federal preemption at the agency level 
that would have been risky to attempt in Congress.419 Parsing the amount of 
delegation ultimately may offer clues as to the differing power of the various interest 
groups that join together to support a single legislative package. 
The dictation/delegation thesis continues to matter in securities law. Notably, the 
FAST Act, signed by President Obama on December 4, 2015, was an omnibus bill 
that encompassed provisions from what had been colloquially known as “JOBS Act 
2.0.”420 These titles do not form part of this Article’s data sample because, unlike the 
other enactments, they are not separate, free-standing securities-focused laws, but 
rather a part of an enormous multisubject enactment. The political economy that gave 
rise to the securities provisions of this legislation would be too hard to disentangle 
from the larger whole (and in any event the comparison would not be fair). Yet it is 
worth noting that these provisions are generally dictatorial. For example, Title LXXI 
(its title number showcases the breadth of the legislation into which it was inserted), 
Improving Access to Capital for Emerging Growth Companies, makes technical 
changes: it shortens the time from twenty-one to fifteen days before a road show that 
an EGC needs to publicly disclose its confidential filing, permits smaller reporting 
companies to use forward incorporation by reference to update information (thereby 
relieving them from having to disclose historical financial statements that will not be 
part of the final registration statement), and provides a one-year grace period if an 
issuer is an ECG when it publicly files for its IPO but loses its EGC status during the 
course of SEC review.421 The only delegations to the SEC are ministerial ones.422 
Similarly most of the other FAST Act securities provisions dictate policy rather than 
delegating it.423  
                                                                                                                 
 
 418. See supra Part V.B.  
 419. See supra notes 376–80 and accompanying text. 
 420. See, e.g., Garrett A. DeVries, Rosa A. Testani, Susan H. Lent & Ryan Thompson, 
Jobs Act 2.0—New FAST Act Legislation Signed into Law To Facilitate Capital Formation, 
AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUEUR & FELD LLP: AG DEAL DIARY (Dec. 9, 2015), https:// 
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-legislation-signed-into-law-to-1.html [https://perma.cc/7XDB-GXEJ]. 
 421. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, §§ 71001–03, 
129 Stat. 1312, 1783–84 (2015). 
 422. Note, while the SEC must revise its general instructions for Forms S-1 and F-1, I 
classify these as ministerial changes where the SEC has no discretion to exercise. 
 423. Title LXXVI, Reforming Access for Investments in Startup Enterprises, provides a 
new resale exception for issuers. § 76001, 129 Stat. at 1787–90. It dictates a host of 
requirements, as long as each purchaser is an accredited investor, there is no general solicita-
tion, and the issuer provides “reasonably current” information, including among other details, 
financial statements from the past two years, including a balance sheet and income statement, 
the issuer’s name, address, nature of business, officers and directors, transfer agent, the exact 
title, class, and par value of the security, the number of shares. It further specifies that such 
statements be prepared according to GAAP and that they are presumed current if the balance 
sheet is within sixteen months of the transaction and the income statement is within twelve 
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This Article poses a challenge for public choice and administrative law scholars. 
How often does the pattern of delegation versus dictation repeat itself in other subject 
areas? It may be that the securities field is sui generis; that perhaps this pattern of 
postcrisis delegation and noncrisis dictation cannot be generalized beyond its narrow 
confines. Securities regulation offers a distinctively attractive place from which to 
launch the delegation/dictation thesis, whatever its reach may ultimately prove to be, 
because securities law is relatively noncontroversial in the public mind. Testing the 
validity of the dictation/delegation thesis in more politically charged fields such as 
banking regulation and tax may reveal different strategies employed by industries 
looking to implement their policy preferences into law and regulation. The 
dictation/delegation thesis offered and tested here is thus an important step—but only 
a first step—in further exploring its importance to the field of delegation. 
                                                                                                                 
 
months of the transaction. If the balance sheet is from more than six months prior to the 
transaction date, it must be accompanied by additional income statements from the time of the 
balance sheet up until six months prior to the transaction date. The title goes on to dictate still 
more requirements, and contains not a single delegation. Title LXXXIV, Small Company 
Simple Registration, directs the SEC to revise Form S-1 to allow smaller reporting companies 
to automatically update information in an S-1 registration statement after by incorporating 
reports filed with the SEC after the registration statement is deemed effective. This ability to 
“forward-incorporate” avoids the cost and complication of smaller companies having to update 
the statement with supplements or post-effective amendments. This is a ministerial delegation, 
since all the SEC must do is implement Congress’ directive. However, the dictation/delegation 
pattern is no binary. Title LXXII, Disclosure Modernization and Simplification does contain 
two substantial delegations.  
